android_kernel_lge_bullhead/include/net/flow.h

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/*
*
* Generic internet FLOW.
*
*/
#ifndef _NET_FLOW_H
#define _NET_FLOW_H
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
/*
* ifindex generation is per-net namespace, and loopback is
* always the 1st device in ns (see net_dev_init), thus any
* loopback device should get ifindex 1
*/
#define LOOPBACK_IFINDEX 1
struct flowi_common {
int flowic_oif;
int flowic_iif;
__u32 flowic_mark;
__u8 flowic_tos;
__u8 flowic_scope;
__u8 flowic_proto;
__u8 flowic_flags;
#define FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC 0x01
#define FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP 0x02
#define FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH 0x04
__u32 flowic_secid;
kuid_t flowic_uid;
};
union flowi_uli {
struct {
__be16 dport;
__be16 sport;
} ports;
struct {
__u8 type;
__u8 code;
} icmpt;
struct {
__le16 dport;
__le16 sport;
} dnports;
__be32 spi;
__be32 gre_key;
struct {
__u8 type;
} mht;
};
struct flowi4 {
struct flowi_common __fl_common;
#define flowi4_oif __fl_common.flowic_oif
#define flowi4_iif __fl_common.flowic_iif
#define flowi4_mark __fl_common.flowic_mark
#define flowi4_tos __fl_common.flowic_tos
#define flowi4_scope __fl_common.flowic_scope
#define flowi4_proto __fl_common.flowic_proto
#define flowi4_flags __fl_common.flowic_flags
#define flowi4_secid __fl_common.flowic_secid
#define flowi4_uid __fl_common.flowic_uid
/* (saddr,daddr) must be grouped, same order as in IP header */
__be32 saddr;
__be32 daddr;
union flowi_uli uli;
#define fl4_sport uli.ports.sport
#define fl4_dport uli.ports.dport
#define fl4_icmp_type uli.icmpt.type
#define fl4_icmp_code uli.icmpt.code
#define fl4_ipsec_spi uli.spi
#define fl4_mh_type uli.mht.type
#define fl4_gre_key uli.gre_key
} __attribute__((__aligned__(BITS_PER_LONG/8)));
static inline void flowi4_init_output(struct flowi4 *fl4, int oif,
__u32 mark, __u8 tos, __u8 scope,
__u8 proto, __u8 flags,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
__be16 dport, __be16 sport,
kuid_t uid)
{
fl4->flowi4_oif = oif;
fl4->flowi4_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
fl4->flowi4_mark = mark;
fl4->flowi4_tos = tos;
fl4->flowi4_scope = scope;
fl4->flowi4_proto = proto;
fl4->flowi4_flags = flags;
fl4->flowi4_secid = 0;
fl4->flowi4_uid = uid;
fl4->daddr = daddr;
fl4->saddr = saddr;
fl4->fl4_dport = dport;
fl4->fl4_sport = sport;
}
/* Reset some input parameters after previous lookup */
static inline void flowi4_update_output(struct flowi4 *fl4, int oif, __u8 tos,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr)
{
fl4->flowi4_oif = oif;
fl4->flowi4_tos = tos;
fl4->daddr = daddr;
fl4->saddr = saddr;
}
struct flowi6 {
struct flowi_common __fl_common;
#define flowi6_oif __fl_common.flowic_oif
#define flowi6_iif __fl_common.flowic_iif
#define flowi6_mark __fl_common.flowic_mark
#define flowi6_tos __fl_common.flowic_tos
#define flowi6_scope __fl_common.flowic_scope
#define flowi6_proto __fl_common.flowic_proto
#define flowi6_flags __fl_common.flowic_flags
#define flowi6_secid __fl_common.flowic_secid
#define flowi6_uid __fl_common.flowic_uid
struct in6_addr daddr;
struct in6_addr saddr;
__be32 flowlabel;
union flowi_uli uli;
#define fl6_sport uli.ports.sport
#define fl6_dport uli.ports.dport
#define fl6_icmp_type uli.icmpt.type
#define fl6_icmp_code uli.icmpt.code
#define fl6_ipsec_spi uli.spi
#define fl6_mh_type uli.mht.type
#define fl6_gre_key uli.gre_key
} __attribute__((__aligned__(BITS_PER_LONG/8)));
struct flowidn {
struct flowi_common __fl_common;
#define flowidn_oif __fl_common.flowic_oif
#define flowidn_iif __fl_common.flowic_iif
#define flowidn_mark __fl_common.flowic_mark
#define flowidn_scope __fl_common.flowic_scope
#define flowidn_proto __fl_common.flowic_proto
#define flowidn_flags __fl_common.flowic_flags
__le16 daddr;
__le16 saddr;
union flowi_uli uli;
#define fld_sport uli.ports.sport
#define fld_dport uli.ports.dport
} __attribute__((__aligned__(BITS_PER_LONG/8)));
struct flowi {
union {
struct flowi_common __fl_common;
struct flowi4 ip4;
struct flowi6 ip6;
struct flowidn dn;
} u;
#define flowi_oif u.__fl_common.flowic_oif
#define flowi_iif u.__fl_common.flowic_iif
#define flowi_mark u.__fl_common.flowic_mark
#define flowi_tos u.__fl_common.flowic_tos
#define flowi_scope u.__fl_common.flowic_scope
#define flowi_proto u.__fl_common.flowic_proto
#define flowi_flags u.__fl_common.flowic_flags
#define flowi_secid u.__fl_common.flowic_secid
#define flowi_uid u.__fl_common.flowic_uid
} __attribute__((__aligned__(BITS_PER_LONG/8)));
static inline struct flowi *flowi4_to_flowi(struct flowi4 *fl4)
{
return container_of(fl4, struct flowi, u.ip4);
}
static inline struct flowi *flowi6_to_flowi(struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
return container_of(fl6, struct flowi, u.ip6);
}
static inline struct flowi *flowidn_to_flowi(struct flowidn *fldn)
{
return container_of(fldn, struct flowi, u.dn);
}
typedef unsigned long flow_compare_t;
static inline size_t flow_key_size(u16 family)
{
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct flowi4) % sizeof(flow_compare_t));
return sizeof(struct flowi4) / sizeof(flow_compare_t);
case AF_INET6:
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct flowi6) % sizeof(flow_compare_t));
return sizeof(struct flowi6) / sizeof(flow_compare_t);
case AF_DECnet:
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct flowidn) % sizeof(flow_compare_t));
return sizeof(struct flowidn) / sizeof(flow_compare_t);
}
return 0;
}
#define FLOW_DIR_IN 0
#define FLOW_DIR_OUT 1
#define FLOW_DIR_FWD 2
struct net;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 08:12:27 +01:00
struct sock;
struct flow_cache_ops;
struct flow_cache_object {
const struct flow_cache_ops *ops;
};
struct flow_cache_ops {
struct flow_cache_object *(*get)(struct flow_cache_object *);
int (*check)(struct flow_cache_object *);
void (*delete)(struct flow_cache_object *);
};
typedef struct flow_cache_object *(*flow_resolve_t)(
struct net *net, const struct flowi *key, u16 family,
u8 dir, struct flow_cache_object *oldobj, void *ctx);
extern struct flow_cache_object *flow_cache_lookup(
struct net *net, const struct flowi *key, u16 family,
u8 dir, flow_resolve_t resolver, void *ctx);
extern void flow_cache_flush(void);
extern void flow_cache_flush_deferred(void);
extern atomic_t flow_cache_genid;
#endif