commit f1712c73714088a7252d276a57126d56c7d37e64 upstream.
Zhang Yanmin reported crashes [1] and provided a patch adding a
synchronize_rcu() call in can_rx_unregister()
The main problem seems that the sockets themselves are not RCU
protected.
If CAN uses RCU for delivery, then sockets should be freed only after
one RCU grace period.
Recent kernels could use sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE), but let's
ease stable backports with the following fix instead.
[1]
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [<ffffffff81495e25>] selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x65/0x2a0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff81485d8c>] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x60
[<ffffffff81d55771>] sk_filter+0x41/0x210
[<ffffffff81d12913>] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x53/0x3a0
[<ffffffff81f0a2b3>] raw_rcv+0x2a3/0x3c0
[<ffffffff81f06eab>] can_rcv_filter+0x12b/0x370
[<ffffffff81f07af9>] can_receive+0xd9/0x120
[<ffffffff81f07beb>] can_rcv+0xab/0x100
[<ffffffff81d362ac>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xd8c/0x11f0
[<ffffffff81d36734>] __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0xb0
[<ffffffff81d37f67>] process_backlog+0x127/0x280
[<ffffffff81d36f7b>] net_rx_action+0x33b/0x4f0
[<ffffffff810c88d4>] __do_softirq+0x184/0x440
[<ffffffff81f9e86c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
<EOI>
[<ffffffff810c76fb>] do_softirq.part.18+0x3b/0x40
[<ffffffff810c8bed>] do_softirq+0x1d/0x20
[<ffffffff81d30085>] netif_rx_ni+0xe5/0x110
[<ffffffff8199cc87>] slcan_receive_buf+0x507/0x520
[<ffffffff8167ef7c>] flush_to_ldisc+0x21c/0x230
[<ffffffff810e3baf>] process_one_work+0x24f/0x670
[<ffffffff810e44ed>] worker_thread+0x9d/0x6f0
[<ffffffff810e4450>] ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480
[<ffffffff810ebafc>] kthread+0x12c/0x150
[<ffffffff81f9ccef>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
Reported-by: Zhang Yanmin <yanmin.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 0294112ee3135fbd15eaa70015af8283642dd970 upstream.
This effectively reverts the following three commits:
7bc10388ccdd ACPI / resources: free memory on error in add_region_before()
0f1b414d1907 ACPI / PNP: Avoid conflicting resource reservations
b9a5e5e18fbf ACPI / init: Fix the ordering of acpi_reserve_resources()
(commit b9a5e5e18fbf introduced regressions some of which, but not
all, were addressed by commit 0f1b414d1907 and commit 7bc10388ccdd
was a fixup on top of the latter) and causes ACPI fixed hardware
resources to be reserved at the fs_initcall_sync stage of system
initialization.
The story is as follows. First, a boot regression was reported due
to an apparent resource reservation ordering change after a commit
that shouldn't lead to such changes. Investigation led to the
conclusion that the problem happened because acpi_reserve_resources()
was executed at the device_initcall() stage of system initialization
which wasn't strictly ordered with respect to driver initialization
(and with respect to the initialization of the pcieport driver in
particular), so a random change causing the device initcalls to be
run in a different order might break things.
The response to that was to attempt to run acpi_reserve_resources()
as soon as we knew that ACPI would be in use (commit b9a5e5e18fbf).
However, that turned out to be too early, because it caused resource
reservations made by the PNP system driver to fail on at least one
system and that failure was addressed by commit 0f1b414d1907.
That fix still turned out to be insufficient, though, because
calling acpi_reserve_resources() before the fs_initcall stage of
system initialization caused a boot regression to happen on the
eCAFE EC-800-H20G/S netbook. That meant that we only could call
acpi_reserve_resources() at the fs_initcall initialization stage
or later, but then we might just as well call it after the PNP
initalization in which case commit 0f1b414d1907 wouldn't be
necessary any more.
For this reason, the changes made by commit 0f1b414d1907 are reverted
(along with a memory leak fixup on top of that commit), the changes
made by commit b9a5e5e18fbf that went too far are reverted too and
acpi_reserve_resources() is changed into fs_initcall_sync, which
will cause it to be executed after the PNP subsystem initialization
(which is an fs_initcall) and before device initcalls (including
the pcieport driver initialization) which should avoid the initial
issue.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100581
Link: http://marc.info/?t=143092384600002&r=1&w=2
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99831
Link: http://marc.info/?t=143389402600001&r=1&w=2
Fixes: b9a5e5e18fbf "ACPI / init: Fix the ordering of acpi_reserve_resources()"
Reported-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 0f1b414d190724617eb1cdd615592fa8cd9d0b50 upstream.
Commit b9a5e5e18fbf "ACPI / init: Fix the ordering of
acpi_reserve_resources()" overlooked the fact that the memory
and/or I/O regions reserved by acpi_reserve_resources() may
conflict with those reserved by the PNP "system" driver.
If that conflict actually takes place, it causes the reservations
made by the "system" driver to fail while before commit b9a5e5e18fbf
all reservations made by it and by acpi_reserve_resources() would be
successful. In turn, that allows the resources that haven't been
reserved by the "system" driver to be used by others (e.g. PCI) which
sometimes leads to functional problems (up to and including boot
failures).
To fix that issue, introduce a common resource reservation routine,
acpi_reserve_region(), to be used by both acpi_reserve_resources()
and the "system" driver, that will track all resources reserved by
it and avoid making conflicting requests.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99831
Link: http://marc.info/?t=143389402600001&r=1&w=2
Fixes: b9a5e5e18fbf "ACPI / init: Fix the ordering of acpi_reserve_resources()"
Reported-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit e33886b38cc82a9fc3b2d655dfc7f50467594138 upstream.
Add two helpers to make it easier to treat the refcount as boolean.
[js] do not involve WARN_ON_ONCE as it causes build failures
Suggested-by: Jason Baron <jasonbaron0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
[wt: only backported for use in next fix ;
s/static_key_count(key)/atomic_read(&key->enabled)/]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit bf7165cfa23695c51998231c4efa080fe1d3548d upstream.
There are several trace include files that define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE.
Include several of them in the same .c file (as I currently have in
some code I am working on), and the compile will blow up with a
"warning: "TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE" redefined #define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE syscalls"
Every other include file in include/trace/events/ avoids that issue
by having a #undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE before the #define; syscalls.h
should have one, too.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160928225554.13bd7ac6@annuminas.surriel.com
Fixes: b8007ef742 ("tracing: Separate raw syscall from syscall tracer")
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 251af29c320d86071664f02c76f0d063a19fefdf upstream.
It is not sufficient to just check that the lock pids match when
granting a callback, we also need to ensure that we're granting
the callback on the right file.
Reported-by: Pankaj Singh <psingh.ait@gmail.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 55efcfcd7776165b294f8b5cd6e05ca00ec89b7c upstream.
The RDMA core uses ib_pack() to convert from unpacked CPU structs
to on-the-wire bitpacked structs.
This process requires that 1 bit fields are declared as u8 in the
unpacked struct, otherwise the packing process does not read the
value properly and the packed result is wired to 0. Several
places wrongly used int.
Crucially this means the kernel has never, set reversible
correctly in the path record request. It has always asked for
irreversible paths even if the ULP requests otherwise.
When the kernel is used with a SM that supports this feature, it
completely breaks communication management if reversible paths are
not properly requested.
The only reason this ever worked is because opensm ignores the
reversible bit.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit d71b7896886345c53ef1d84bda2bc758554f5d61 upstream.
syzkaller found another out of bound access in ip_options_compile(),
or more exactly in cipso_v4_validate()
Fixes: 20e2a86485 ("cipso: handle CIPSO options correctly when NetLabel is disabled")
Fixes: 446fda4f26 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 engine")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 57ea52a865144aedbcd619ee0081155e658b6f7d upstream.
The GRO fast path caches the frag0 address. This address becomes
invalid if frag0 is modified by pskb_may_pull or its variants.
So whenever that happens we must disable the frag0 optimization.
This is usually done through the combination of gro_header_hard
and gro_header_slow, however, the IPv6 extension header path did
the pulling directly and would continue to use the GRO fast path
incorrectly.
This patch fixes it by disabling the fast path when we enter the
IPv6 extension header path.
Fixes: 78a478d0ef ("gro: Inline skb_gro_header and cache frag0 virtual address")
Reported-by: Slava Shwartsman <slavash@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 777c6e0daebb3fcefbbd6f620410a946b07ef6d0 upstream.
Yu Zhao has noticed that __unregister_cpu_notifier only unregisters its
notifiers when HOTPLUG_CPU=y while the registration might succeed even
when HOTPLUG_CPU=n if MODULE is enabled. This means that e.g. zswap
might keep a stale notifier on the list on the manual clean up during
the pool tear down and thus corrupt the list. Resulting in the following
[ 144.964346] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880658a2be78
[ 144.971337] IP: [<ffffffffa290b00b>] raw_notifier_chain_register+0x1b/0x40
<snipped>
[ 145.122628] Call Trace:
[ 145.125086] [<ffffffffa28e5cf8>] __register_cpu_notifier+0x18/0x20
[ 145.131350] [<ffffffffa2a5dd73>] zswap_pool_create+0x273/0x400
[ 145.137268] [<ffffffffa2a5e0fc>] __zswap_param_set+0x1fc/0x300
[ 145.143188] [<ffffffffa2944c1d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 145.149018] [<ffffffffa2908798>] ? kernel_param_lock+0x28/0x30
[ 145.154940] [<ffffffffa2a3e8cf>] ? __might_fault+0x4f/0xa0
[ 145.160511] [<ffffffffa2a5e237>] zswap_compressor_param_set+0x17/0x20
[ 145.167035] [<ffffffffa2908d3c>] param_attr_store+0x5c/0xb0
[ 145.172694] [<ffffffffa290848d>] module_attr_store+0x1d/0x30
[ 145.178443] [<ffffffffa2b2b41f>] sysfs_kf_write+0x4f/0x70
[ 145.183925] [<ffffffffa2b2a5b9>] kernfs_fop_write+0x149/0x180
[ 145.189761] [<ffffffffa2a99248>] __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
[ 145.194982] [<ffffffffa2a9a412>] vfs_write+0xb2/0x1a0
[ 145.200122] [<ffffffffa2a9a732>] SyS_write+0x52/0xa0
[ 145.205177] [<ffffffffa2ff4d97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17
This can be even triggered manually by changing
/sys/module/zswap/parameters/compressor multiple times.
Fix this issue by making unregister APIs symmetric to the register so
there are no surprises.
[js] backport to 3.12
Fixes: 47e627bc8c ("[PATCH] hotplug: Allow modules to use the cpu hotplug notifiers even if !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU")
Reported-and-tested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161207135438.4310-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef upstream.
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
[wt: dropped hfsplus changes : no xattr in 3.10]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 6bf37e5aa90f18baf5acf4874bca505dd667c37f upstream.
When comparing MAC hashes, AEAD authentication tags, or other hash
values in the context of authentication or integrity checking, it
is important not to leak timing information to a potential attacker,
i.e. when communication happens over a network.
Bytewise memory comparisons (such as memcmp) are usually optimized so
that they return a nonzero value as soon as a mismatch is found. E.g,
on x86_64/i5 for 512 bytes this can be ~50 cyc for a full mismatch
and up to ~850 cyc for a full match (cold). This early-return behavior
can leak timing information as a side channel, allowing an attacker to
iteratively guess the correct result.
This patch adds a new method crypto_memneq ("memory not equal to each
other") to the crypto API that compares memory areas of the same length
in roughly "constant time" (cache misses could change the timing, but
since they don't reveal information about the content of the strings
being compared, they are effectively benign). Iow, best and worst case
behaviour take the same amount of time to complete (in contrast to
memcmp).
Note that crypto_memneq (unlike memcmp) can only be used to test for
equality or inequality, NOT for lexicographical order. This, however,
is not an issue for its use-cases within the crypto API.
We tried to locate all of the places in the crypto API where memcmp was
being used for authentication or integrity checking, and convert them
over to crypto_memneq.
crypto_memneq is declared noinline, placed in its own source file,
and compiled with optimizations that might increase code size disabled
("Os") because a smart compiler (or LTO) might notice that the return
value is always compared against zero/nonzero, and might then
reintroduce the same early-return optimization that we are trying to
avoid.
Using #pragma or __attribute__ optimization annotations of the code
for disabling optimization was avoided as it seems to be considered
broken or unmaintained for long time in GCC [1]. Therefore, we work
around that by specifying the compile flag for memneq.o directly in
the Makefile. We found that this seems to be most appropriate.
As we use ("Os"), this patch also provides a loop-free "fast-path" for
frequently used 16 byte digests. Similarly to kernel library string
functions, leave an option for future even further optimized architecture
specific assembler implementations.
This was a joint work of James Yonan and Daniel Borkmann. Also thanks
for feedback from Florian Weimer on this and earlier proposals [2].
[1] http://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc/2012-07/msg00211.html
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/2/10/131
Signed-off-by: James Yonan <james@openvpn.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit b9dd46188edc2f0d1f37328637860bb65a771124 upstream.
F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported
size of disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bug: 36815012
Change-Id: I30ea36df066bc07e32e767336b7cae12063fe415
Merge 'android-msm-bullhead-3.10-nyc-mr2' into
'android-msm-bullhead-3.10'
July 2017.1
Bug: 38137577
Change-Id: Id2935b141bbaa52d6ec63648551ac5dec3e21487
The cache maintenance routines in ashmem were causing
several security issues. Since they are not being used
anymore by any drivers, its well to remove them entirely.
Bug: 34126808
Bug: 34173755
Bug: 34203176
CRs-Fixed: 1107034, 2001129, 2007786
Change-Id: I955e33d90b888d58db5cf6bb490905283374425b
Signed-off-by: Sudarshan Rajagopalan <sudaraja@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Dennis Cagle <d-cagle@codeaurora.org>
To prevent protential risk of memory leak caused by closing socket with
out untag it from qtaguid module, the qtaguid module now do not hold any
socket file reference count. Instead, it will increase the sk_refcnt of
the sk struct to prevent a reuse of the socket pointer. And when a socket
is released. It will delete the tag if the socket is previously tagged so
no more resources is held by xt_qtaguid moudle. A flag is added to the untag
process to prevent possible kernel crash caused by fail to delete
corresponding socket_tag_entry list.
Bug: 36374484
Test: compile and run test under system/extra/test/iptables,
run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t android.net.cts.SocketRefCntTest
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Change-Id: Iea7c3bf0c59b9774a5114af905b2405f6bc9ee52
Robust context attempts to perform a rendering that takes too long
whether due to an infinite loop in a shader or even just a rendering
operation that takes too long on the given hardware. This type of
attempts can result into GPU faults. Robust context expect driver
to replay IB instead skip IB and if it fails on replay context has
to be invalidated.
KGSL_CONTEXT_INVALIDATE_ON_FAULT flag allows draw context to execute
only replay policy on GPU fault recovery instead of going to default
recovery policy. User space has to set this flag during the context
creation.
Bug: 34887800
Change-Id: If42dc5afc7d5ed1226b73ae5abfa2648d7acf2c3
Signed-off-by: Hareesh Gundu <hareeshg@codeaurora.org>
This implements:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7559
Backoff is performed according to RFC3315 section 14:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3315#section-14
We allow setting /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/*/router_solicitations
to a negative value meaning an unlimited number of retransmits,
and we make this the new default (inline with the RFC).
We also add a new setting:
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/*/router_solicitation_max_interval
defaulting to 1 hour (per RFC recommendation).
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Acked-by: Erik Kline <ek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit bd11f0741fa5a2c296629898ad07759dd12b35bb in
DaveM's net-next/master, should make Linus' tree in 4.9-rc1)
Change-Id: Ia32cdc5c61481893ef8040734e014bf2229fc39e
Issue:
Missing bound check when writing into the output array
buffer, which can lead to out-of-bound heap write.
Fix:
Addding hardcoded constant 8 in the MSM_OUTPUT_BUF_CNT
macro and size check to the place where the array is
accessed. Returning '0' if exceeds MSM_OUTPUT_BUF_CNT.
Caller will return -EINVAL for '0'.
Bug: 34621613
Change-Id: Ic03f86e3e47ece9ca7069527e741a75ad9a0f83f
CRs-Fixed: 2004036
Signed-off-by: Pratap Nirujogi <pratapn@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Dennis Cagle <d-cagle@codeaurora.org>
This commit adds a new sysctl accept_ra_rt_info_min_plen that
defines the minimum acceptable prefix length of Route Information
Options. The new sysctl is intended to be used together with
accept_ra_rt_info_max_plen to configure a range of acceptable
prefix lengths. It is useful to prevent misconfigurations from
unintentionally blackholing too much of the IPv6 address space
(e.g., home routers announcing RIOs for fc00::/7, which is
incorrect).
Backport of net-next commit bbea124bc99d ("net: ipv6: Add sysctl for minimum prefix len acceptable in RIOs.")
[lorenzo@google.com: fixed conflicts in include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h]
Bug: 33333670
Test: net_test passes
Signed-off-by: Joel Scherpelz <jscherpelz@google.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The trace_printk() code will allocate extra buffers if the compile detects
that a trace_printk() is used. To do this, the format of the trace_printk()
is saved to the __trace_printk_fmt section, and if that section is bigger
than zero, the buffers are allocated (along with a message that this has
happened).
If trace_printk() uses a format that is not a constant, and thus something
not guaranteed to be around when the print happens, the compiler optimizes
the fmt out, as it is not used, and the __trace_printk_fmt section is not
filled. This means the kernel will not allocate the special buffers needed
for the trace_printk() and the trace_printk() will not write anything to the
tracing buffer.
Adding a "__used" to the variable in the __trace_printk_fmt section will
keep it around, even though it is set to NULL. This will keep the string
from being printed in the debugfs/tracing/printk_formats section as it is
not needed.
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Fixes: 07d777fe8c "tracing: Add percpu buffers for trace_printk()"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.5+
Bug: 34277115
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Change-Id: I10ce56caa41c7644d9d290d9ed272a6d156c938c
commit c3c87e770458aa004bd7ed3f29945ff436fd6511 upstream.
The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.
Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.
Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.
Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Bug: 34515362
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.090683288@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Change-Id: I72247f51388177f172845ccd4621debcd3158940
Create cnss_genl driver to create a netlink family cld80211
and make it available to cld driver and applications when
they query for it.
This driver creates multicast groups to facilitate communication
from cld driver to userspace and allows cld driver to register
for different commands from user space.
Resolve compilation errors and tweak netlink family creation
Change-Id: I0795dd08b6429fad60187fee724b3fd3ccfa5603
CRs-Fixed: 1100401
Bug: 32775496
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Define macro to indicate backport support for using random MAC
addresses for scan while unassociated.
Change-Id: I2b7318ca8f6af29a9eb13d14e8c1e55bd41ae654
CRs-Fixed: 1082480
Bug: 35436707
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Add the necessary feature flags and a scan flag to support using
random MAC addresses for scan while unassociated.
The configuration for this supports an arbitrary MAC address
value and mask, so that any kind of configuration (e.g. fixed
OUI or full 46-bit random) can be requested. Full 46-bit random
is the default when no other configuration is passed.
Also add a small helper function to use the addr/mask correctly.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Git-commit: ad2b26abc157460ca6fac1a53a2bfeade283adfa
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jberg/mac80211-next.git
[dasaris@codeaurora.org: backport to 3.18 excluding the changes in
nl80211_parse_wowlan_nd]
Change-Id: Id30d201358654c77a99f46500178ebf975d609d5
CRs-Fixed: 1082480
Bug: 35436707
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
(cherry pick from commit 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef)
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
NB: conflicts resolution included extending the change to all visible
users of the near deprecated function posix_acl_equiv_mode
replaced with posix_acl_update_mode. We did not resolve the ACL
leak in this CL, require additional upstream fixes.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Bug: 32458736
Change-Id: I19591ad452cc825ac282b3cfd2daaa72aa9a1ac1
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
(cherry picked from commit 69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121)
Bug: 32761463
Change-Id: I69b2fba2112db2ece09a1bf61a44f8fc4db00820
(cherry picked from commit 651be3cb085341a21847e47c694c249c3e1e4e5b)
We only support breakpoint/watchpoint of length 1, 2, 4 and 8. If we can
support other length as well, then user may watch more data with less
number of watchpoints (provided hardware supports it). For example: if we
have to watch only 4th, 5th and 6th byte from a 64 bit aligned address, we
will have to use two slots to implement it currently. One slot will watch a
half word at offset 4 and other a byte at offset 6. If we can have a
watchpoint of length 3 then we can watch it with single slot as well.
ARM64 hardware does support such functionality, therefore adding these new
definitions in generic layer.
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Labath <labath@google.com>
[pavel: tools/include/uapi/linux/hw_breakpoint.h is not present in this branch]
Change-Id: Ie17ed89ca526e4fddf591bb4e556fdfb55fc2eac
Bug: 30919905
Add whitelist support for listener to send modified resp to TZ;
also add whitelist support for kernel client; and change the method
to check whitelist feature.
Bug: 31268796
CRs-Fixed: 1021945
Change-Id: I0030b0008d6224cda3fdc1f80308a7e9bcfe4405
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Biswajit Paul <biswajitpaul@codeaurora.org>
qseecom_send_modfd_cmd converts ION buffer's virtual address to
scatter gather(SG) list and then sends them to TA by populating
SG list into message buffer. As the physical memory address in
SG list is used directly by TA, this allows a malicious TA to
access/corrupt arbitrary physical memory and may lead to the
process gaining kernel/root privileges. Thus, make changes to
have the QSEEComm driver passing a list of whitelist buffers
that is allowed to be mapped by TA, and the QSEE kernel, in turn,
should add checks to the register_shared_buffer syscall to make
sure the shared buffers an application is mapping falls within
one of these whitelist buffers.
Bug: 31268796
CRs-fixed: 1021945
Change-Id: I776ead0030cad167afcf41ab985db7151a42d126
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Biswajit Paul <biswajitpaul@codeaurora.org>
commit 9a6dc644512fd083400a96ac4a035ac154fe6b8d upstream.
set_bit() and clear_bit() take the bit number so this code is really
doing "1 << (1 << irq)" which is a double shift bug. It's done
consistently so it won't cause a problem unless "irq" is more than 4.
Fixes: 70c6cce040 ('mfd: Support 88pm80x in 80x driver')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 9abefcb1aaa58b9d5aa40a8bb12c87d02415e4c8 upstream.
A timer was used to restart after the bus-off state, leading to a
relatively large can_restart() executed in an interrupt context,
which in turn sets up pinctrl. When this happens during system boot,
there is a high probability of grabbing the pinctrl_list_mutex,
which is locked already by the probe() of other device, making the
kernel suspect a deadlock condition [1].
To resolve this issue, the restart_timer is replaced by a delayed
work.
[1] https://github.com/victronenergy/venus/issues/24
Signed-off-by: Sergei Miroshnichenko <sergeimir@emcraft.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 20c64d5cd5a2bdcdc8982a06cb05e5e1bd851a3d upstream.
A malicious TCP receiver, sending SACK, can force the sender to split
skbs in write queue and increase its memory usage.
Then, when socket is closed and its write queue purged, we might
overflow sk_forward_alloc (It becomes negative)
sk_mem_reclaim() does nothing in this case, and more than 2GB
are leaked from TCP perspective (tcp_memory_allocated is not changed)
Then warnings trigger from inet_sock_destruct() and
sk_stream_kill_queues() seeing a not zero sk_forward_alloc
All TCP stack can be stuck because TCP is under memory pressure.
A simple fix is to preemptively reclaim from sk_mem_uncharge().
This makes sure a socket wont have more than 2 MB forward allocated,
after burst and idle period.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 1a24e04e4b50939daa3041682b38b82c896ca438 upstream.
sk_mem_reclaim_partial() goal is to ensure each socket has
one SK_MEM_QUANTUM forward allocation. This is needed both for
performance and better handling of memory pressure situations in
follow up patches.
SK_MEM_QUANTUM is currently a page, but might be reduced to 4096 bytes
as some arches have 64KB pages.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 24b27fc4cdf9e10c5e79e5923b6b7c2c5c95096c upstream.
Following few steps will crash kernel -
(a) Create bonding master
> modprobe bonding miimon=50
(b) Create macvlan bridge on eth2
> ip link add link eth2 dev mvl0 address aa:0:0:0:0:01 \
type macvlan
(c) Now try adding eth2 into the bond
> echo +eth2 > /sys/class/net/bond0/bonding/slaves
<crash>
Bonding does lots of things before checking if the device enslaved is
busy or not.
In this case when the notifier call-chain sends notifications, the
bond_netdev_event() assumes that the rx_handler /rx_handler_data is
registered while the bond_enslave() hasn't progressed far enough to
register rx_handler for the new slave.
This patch adds a rx_handler check that can be performed right at the
beginning of the enslave code to avoid getting into this situation.
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3 upstream.
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit bb1fceca22492109be12640d49f5ea5a544c6bb4 upstream.
When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the
tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail()
Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb.
If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb.
Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and
we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb)
Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and
access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped,
this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy,
returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug
features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel.
This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller.
Fixes: 6859d49475 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb")
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 23f4ffedb7d751c7e298732ba91ca75d224bc1a6 upstream.
skb->cb may contain data from previous layers. In the observed scenario,
the garbage data were misinterpreted as IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size, so
that small packets sent through the tunnel are mistakenly fragmented.
This patch unconditionally clears the control buffer in ip6tunnel_xmit(),
which affects ip6_tunnel, ip6_udp_tunnel and ip6_gre. Currently none of
these tunnels set IP6CB(skb)->flags, otherwise it needs to be done earlier.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit c15b1ccadb323ea50023e8f1cca2954129a62b51 upstream.
addrconf_join_solict and addrconf_join_anycast may cause actions which
need rtnl locked, especially on first address creation.
A new DAD state is introduced which defers processing of the initial
DAD processing into a workqueue.
To get rtnl lock we need to push the code paths which depend on those
calls up to workqueues, specifically addrconf_verify and the DAD
processing.
(v2)
addrconf_dad_failure needs to be queued up to the workqueue, too. This
patch introduces a new DAD state and stop the DAD processing in the
workqueue (this is because of the possible ipv6_del_addr processing
which removes the solicited multicast address from the device).
addrconf_verify_lock is removed, too. After the transition it is not
needed any more.
As we are not processing in bottom half anymore we need to be a bit more
careful about disabling bottom half out when we lock spin_locks which are also
used in bh.
Relevant backtrace:
[ 541.030090] RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (4496)
[ 541.031143] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G O 3.10.33-1-amd64-vyatta #1
[ 541.031145] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[ 541.031146] ffffffff8148a9f0 000000000000002f ffffffff813c98c1 ffff88007c4451f8
[ 541.031148] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff813d3540 ffff88007fc03d18
[ 541.031150] 0000880000000006 ffff88007c445000 ffffffffa0194160 0000000000000000
[ 541.031152] Call Trace:
[ 541.031153] <IRQ> [<ffffffff8148a9f0>] ? dump_stack+0xd/0x17
[ 541.031180] [<ffffffff813c98c1>] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x101/0x180
[ 541.031183] [<ffffffff813d3540>] ? __hw_addr_create_ex+0x60/0xc0
[ 541.031185] [<ffffffff813cfe1a>] ? __dev_set_rx_mode+0xaa/0xc0
[ 541.031189] [<ffffffff813d3a81>] ? __dev_mc_add+0x61/0x90
[ 541.031198] [<ffffffffa01dcf9c>] ? igmp6_group_added+0xfc/0x1a0 [ipv6]
[ 541.031208] [<ffffffff8111237b>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xcb/0xd0
[ 541.031212] [<ffffffffa01ddcd7>] ? ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x267/0x300 [ipv6]
[ 541.031216] [<ffffffffa01c2fae>] ? addrconf_join_solict+0x2e/0x40 [ipv6]
[ 541.031219] [<ffffffffa01ba2e9>] ? ipv6_dev_ac_inc+0x159/0x1f0 [ipv6]
[ 541.031223] [<ffffffffa01c0772>] ? addrconf_join_anycast+0x92/0xa0 [ipv6]
[ 541.031226] [<ffffffffa01c311e>] ? __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x11e/0x1e0 [ipv6]
[ 541.031229] [<ffffffffa01c3213>] ? ipv6_ifa_notify+0x33/0x50 [ipv6]
[ 541.031233] [<ffffffffa01c36c8>] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x28/0x100 [ipv6]
[ 541.031241] [<ffffffff81075c1d>] ? task_cputime+0x2d/0x50
[ 541.031244] [<ffffffffa01c38d6>] ? addrconf_dad_timer+0x136/0x150 [ipv6]
[ 541.031247] [<ffffffffa01c37a0>] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x100/0x100 [ipv6]
[ 541.031255] [<ffffffff8105313a>] ? call_timer_fn.isra.22+0x2a/0x90
[ 541.031258] [<ffffffffa01c37a0>] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x100/0x100 [ipv6]
Hunks and backtrace stolen from a patch by Stephen Hemminger.
Reported-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.y: b7b1bfce: ipv6: split dad and rs timers
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.y
[Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>: resolved minor conflicts in addrconf.c]
Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit b7b1bfce0bb68bd8f6e62a28295922785cc63781 upstream.
This patch splits the timers for duplicate address detection and router
solicitations apart. The router solicitations timer goes into inet6_dev
and the dad timer stays in inet6_ifaddr.
The reason behind this patch is to reduce the number of unneeded router
solicitations send out by the host if additional link-local addresses
are created. Currently we send out RS for every link-local address on
an interface.
If the RS timer fires we pick a source address with ipv6_get_lladdr. This
change could hurt people adding additional link-local addresses and
specifying these addresses in the radvd clients section because we
no longer guarantee that we use every ll address as source address in
router solicitations.
Cc: Flavio Leitner <fleitner@redhat.com>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: David Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reviewed-by: Flavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.y
[Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>: resolved conflicts with 36bddb]
Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 2c861cc65ef4604011a0082e4dcdba2819aa191a upstream.
When loading the ipv6 module, ndisc_init() is called before
ip6_route_init(). As the former registers a handler calling
fib6_run_gc(), this opens a window to run the garbage collector
before necessary data structures are initialized. If a network
device is initialized in this window, adding MAC address to it
triggers a NETDEV_CHANGEADDR event, leading to a crash in
fib6_clean_all().
Take the event handler registration out of ndisc_init() into a
separate function ndisc_late_init() and move it after
ip6_route_init().
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.y
Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 8c7fbe5795a016259445a61e072eb0118aaf6a61 upstream.
Commit 3876488444e7 ("include/stddef.h: Move offsetofend() from vfio.h
to a generic kernel header") added offsetofend outside the normal
include #ifndef/#endif guard. Move it inside.
Miscellanea:
o remove unnecessary blank line
o standardize offsetof macros whitespace style
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: backported only for ipv6 out-of-bounds fix]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit b13460b92093b29347e99d6c3242e350052b62cd upstream.
The macro offsetofend() introduces unnecessary temporary variable
"tmp". The patch avoids that and saves a bit memory in stack.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
[wt: backported only for ipv6 out-of-bounds fix]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit c3c87e770458aa004bd7ed3f29945ff436fd6511 upstream.
The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.
Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.
Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.
Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.090683288@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 4097461897df91041382ff6fcd2bfa7ee6b2448c upstream.
As explained in 1407814240-4275-1-git-send-email-decui@microsoft.com we
have a hard load dependency between i8042 and atkbd which prevents
keyboard from working on Gen2 Hyper-V VMs.
> hyperv_keyboard invokes serio_interrupt(), which needs a valid serio
> driver like atkbd.c. atkbd.c depends on libps2.c because it invokes
> ps2_command(). libps2.c depends on i8042.c because it invokes
> i8042_check_port_owner(). As a result, hyperv_keyboard actually
> depends on i8042.c.
>
> For a Generation 2 Hyper-V VM (meaning no i8042 device emulated), if a
> Linux VM (like Arch Linux) happens to configure CONFIG_SERIO_I8042=m
> rather than =y, atkbd.ko can't load because i8042.ko can't load(due to
> no i8042 device emulated) and finally hyperv_keyboard can't work and
> the user can't input: https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/39820
> (Ubuntu/RHEL/SUSE aren't affected since they use CONFIG_SERIO_I8042=y)
To break the dependency we move away from using i8042_check_port_owner()
and instead allow serio port owner specify a mutex that clients should use
to serialize PS/2 command stream.
Reported-by: Mark Laws <mdl@60hz.org>
Tested-by: Mark Laws <mdl@60hz.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Prevent conflict with possible new upstream ioctls
before it itself is upstreamed.
Test: None
Change-Id: I10cbc01c25f920a626ea7559e8ca80ee08865333
Signed-off-by: Jerry Zhang <zhangjerry@google.com>
commit e23d4159b109167126e5bcd7f3775c95de7fee47 upstream.
Switching iov_iter fault-in to multipages variants has exposed an old
bug in underlying fault_in_multipages_...(); they break if the range
passed to them wraps around. Normally access_ok() done by callers will
prevent such (and it's a guaranteed EFAULT - ERR_PTR() values fall into
such a range and they should not point to any valid objects).
However, on architectures where userland and kernel live in different
MMU contexts (e.g. s390) access_ok() is a no-op and on those a range
with a wraparound can reach fault_in_multipages_...().
Since any wraparound means EFAULT there, the fix is trivial - turn
those
while (uaddr <= end)
...
into
if (unlikely(uaddr > end))
return -EFAULT;
do
...
while (uaddr <= end);
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 2545e5da080b4839dd859e3b09343a884f6ab0e3 upstream.
... in all cases, including the failing access_ok()
Note that some architectures using asm-generic/uaccess.h have
__copy_from_user() not zeroing the tail on failure halfway
through. This variant works either way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[wt: s/might_fault/might_sleep]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 9ad18b75c2f6e4a78ce204e79f37781f8815c0fa upstream.
both for access_ok() failures and for faults halfway through
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 454d5d882c7e412b840e3c99010fe81a9862f6fb upstream.
Using RING_GET_REQUEST() on a shared ring is easy to use incorrectly
(i.e., by not considering that the other end may alter the data in the
shared ring while it is being inspected). Safe usage of a request
generally requires taking a local copy.
Provide a RING_COPY_REQUEST() macro to use instead of
RING_GET_REQUEST() and an open-coded memcpy(). This takes care of
ensuring that the copy is done correctly regardless of any possible
compiler optimizations.
Use a volatile source to prevent the compiler from reordering or
omitting the copy.
This is part of XSA155.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 6a935170a980024dd29199e9dbb5c4da4767a1b9 upstream.
This patch allows af_alg_release_parent to be called even for
nokey sockets.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit a1383cd86a062fc798899ab20f0ec2116cce39cb upstream.
This patch adds a way for skcipher users to determine whether a key
is required by a transform.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit a5596d6332787fd383b3b5427b41f94254430827 upstream.
This patch adds a way for ahash users to determine whether a key
is required by a crypto_ahash transform.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 37766586c965d63758ad542325a96d5384f4a8c9 upstream.
This patch adds a compatibility path to support old applications
that do acept(2) before setkey.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit c840ac6af3f8713a71b4d2363419145760bd6044 upstream.
Each af_alg parent socket obtained by socket(2) corresponds to a
tfm object once bind(2) has succeeded. An accept(2) call on that
parent socket creates a context which then uses the tfm object.
Therefore as long as any child sockets created by accept(2) exist
the parent socket must not be modified or freed.
This patch guarantees this by using locks and a reference count
on the parent socket. Any attempt to modify the parent socket will
fail with EBUSY.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Almost clean cherry pick of c6e9d6f38894798696f23c8084ca7edbf16ee895,
includes change made by merge 0891ad829d2a0501053703df66029e843e3b8365.
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.
The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.
This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.
SYNOPSIS
#include <linux/random.h>
int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo
simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
probabilistic sampling.
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.
If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).
The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
the following function:
int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
if (buflen > 256)
goto failure;
ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == buflen)
return 0;
failure:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
RETURN VALUE
On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the
caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
/dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
signal.
On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
ERRORS
EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)
EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space.
EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and
getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.
EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
in the signal(7) man page.
NOTES
For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended
way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.
However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may
block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The
user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
would be unfriendly.
For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
bytes than requested was returned. In the case of
!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
should be careful) should check for this anyway!
Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for
/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I189ba74070dd6d918b0fdf83ff30bb74ec0f7556
(cherry picked from commit 4af712e8df998475736f3e2727701bd31e3751a9)
Clean cherry pick of commit 4af712e8df998475736f3e2727701bd31e3751a9.
The Tausworthe PRNG is initialized at late_initcall time. At that time the
entropy pool serving get_random_bytes is not filled sufficiently. This
patch adds an additional reseeding step as soon as the nonblocking pool
gets marked as initialized.
On some machines it might be possible that late_initcall gets called after
the pool has been initialized. In this situation we won't reseed again.
(A call to prandom_seed_late blocks later invocations of early reseed
attempts.)
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I4d20e60b5df16228f3a3699d16ed2b1dddcceb2b
(cherry picked from commit 4af712e8df998475736f3e2727701bd31e3751a9)
Use the %pP functionality to explicitly allow kernel
pointers to be logged for stack traces
BUG: 30368199
Change-Id: I495915465565293e9e4da5aa28fbd1d14538d99b
Signed-off-by: Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>
Validate eeprom_name string length before copying into
the userspace buffer.
If more data than required is copied, userspace has the access to
some of kernel data which is not intended.
CRs-Fixed: 1090007
Bug: 32720522
Change-Id: Id40a287e0b1a93cc15d9b02c757fe9f347e285f2
Signed-off-by: Rajesh Bondugula <rajeshb@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: VijayaKumar T M <vtmuni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Yang Guang <guyang@codeaurora.org>
The current mainline has copies propagated to *all* nodes, then
tears down the copies we made for nodes that do not contain
counterparts of the desired mountpoint. That sets the right
propagation graph for the copies (at teardown time we move
the slaves of removed node to a surviving peer or directly
to master), but we end up paying a fairly steep price in
useless allocations. It's fairly easy to create a situation
where N calls of mount(2) create exactly N bindings, with
O(N^2) vfsmounts allocated and freed in process.
Fortunately, it is possible to avoid those allocations/freeings.
The trick is to create copies in the right order and find which
one would've eventually become a master with the current algorithm.
It turns out to be possible in O(nodes getting propagation) time
and with no extra allocations at all.
One part is that we need to make sure that eventual master will be
created before its slaves, so we need to walk the propagation
tree in a different order - by peer groups. And iterate through
the peers before dealing with the next group.
Another thing is finding the (earlier) copy that will be a master
of one we are about to create; to do that we are (temporary) marking
the masters of mountpoints we are attaching the copies to.
Either we are in a peer of the last mountpoint we'd dealt with,
or we have the following situation: we are attaching to mountpoint M,
the last copy S_0 had been attached to M_0 and there are sequences
S_0...S_n, M_0...M_n such that S_{i+1} is a master of S_{i},
S_{i} mounted on M{i} and we need to create a slave of the first S_{k}
such that M is getting propagation from M_{k}. It means that the master
of M_{k} will be among the sequence of masters of M. On the
other hand, the nearest marked node in that sequence will either
be the master of M_{k} or the master of M_{k-1} (the latter -
in the case if M_{k-1} is a slave of something M gets propagation
from, but in a wrong peer group).
So we go through the sequence of masters of M until we find
a marked one (P). Let N be the one before it. Then we go through
the sequence of masters of S_0 until we find one (say, S) mounted
on a node D that has P as master and check if D is a peer of N.
If it is, S will be the master of new copy, if not - the master of S
will be.
That's it for the hard part; the rest is fairly simple. Iterator
is in next_group(), handling of one prospective mountpoint is
propagate_one().
It seems to survive all tests and gives a noticably better performance
than the current mainline for setups that are seriously using shared
subtrees.
Change-Id: I45648e8a405544f768c5956711bdbdf509e2705a
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Sdcardfs uses the same magic value as wrapfs.
This should not be the case. As it is entirely
in memory, the value can be changed without any
loss of compatibility.
Change-Id: I24200b805d5e6d32702638be99e47d50d7f2f746
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
This allows filesystems to use their mount private data to
influence the permssions they use in setattr2. It has
been separated into a new call to avoid disrupting current
setattr users.
Change-Id: I19959038309284448f1b7f232d579674ef546385
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
This allows filesystems to use their mount private data to
influence the permssions they return in permission2. It has
been separated into a new call to avoid disrupting current
permission users.
Change-Id: I9d416e3b8b6eca84ef3e336bd2af89ddd51df6ca
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Now we pass the vfsmount when mounting and remounting.
This allows the filesystem to actually set up the mount
specific data, although we can't quite do anything with
it yet. show_options is expanded to include data that
lives with the mount.
To avoid changing existing filesystems, these have
been added as new vfs functions.
Change-Id: If80670bfad9f287abb8ac22457e1b034c9697097
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
This starts to add private data associated directly
to mount points. The intent is to give filesystems
a sense of where they have come from, as a means of
letting a filesystem take different actions based on
this information.
Change-Id: Ie769d7b3bb2f5972afe05c1bf16cf88c91647ab2
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
- Use the UID in routing lookups made by protocol connect() and
sendmsg() functions.
- Make sure that routing lookups triggered by incoming packets
(e.g., Path MTU discovery) take the UID of the socket into
account.
- For packets not associated with a userspace socket, (e.g., ping
replies) use UID 0 inside the user namespace corresponding to
the network namespace the socket belongs to. This allows
all namespaces to apply routing and iptables rules to
kernel-originated traffic in that namespaces by matching UID 0.
This is better than using the UID of the kernel socket that is
sending the traffic, because the UID of kernel sockets created
at namespace creation time (e.g., the per-processor ICMP and
TCP sockets) is the UID of the user that created the socket,
which might not be mapped in the namespace.
[Backport of net-next e2d118a1cb5e60d077131a09db1d81b90a5295fe]
Bug: 16355602
Change-Id: I126f8359887b5b5bbac68daf0ded89e899cb7cb0
Tested: compiles allnoconfig, allyesconfig, allmodconfig
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/253302
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- Define a new FIB rule attributes, FRA_UID_RANGE, to describe a
range of UIDs.
- Define a RTA_UID attribute for per-UID route lookups and dumps.
- Support passing these attributes to and from userspace via
rtnetlink. The value INVALID_UID indicates no UID was
specified.
- Add a UID field to the flow structures.
[Backport of net-next 622ec2c9d52405973c9f1ca5116eb1c393adfc7d]
Bug: 16355602
Change-Id: I7e3ab388ed862c4b7e39dc8b0209d977cb1129ac
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Protocol sockets (struct sock) don't have UIDs, but most of the
time, they map 1:1 to userspace sockets (struct socket) which do.
Various operations such as the iptables xt_owner match need
access to the "UID of a socket", and do so by following the
backpointer to the struct socket. This involves taking
sk_callback_lock and doesn't work when there is no socket
because userspace has already called close().
Simplify this by adding a sk_uid field to struct sock whose value
matches the UID of the corresponding struct socket. The semantics
are as follows:
1. Whenever sk_socket is non-null: sk_uid is the same as the UID
in sk_socket, i.e., matches the return value of sock_i_uid.
Specifically, the UID is set when userspace calls socket(),
fchown(), or accept().
2. When sk_socket is NULL, sk_uid is defined as follows:
- For a socket that no longer has a sk_socket because
userspace has called close(): the previous UID.
- For a cloned socket (e.g., an incoming connection that is
established but on which userspace has not yet called
accept): the UID of the socket it was cloned from.
- For a socket that has never had an sk_socket: UID 0 inside
the user namespace corresponding to the network namespace
the socket belongs to.
Kernel sockets created by sock_create_kern are a special case
of #1 and sk_uid is the user that created them. For kernel
sockets created at network namespace creation time, such as the
per-processor ICMP and TCP sockets, this is the user that created
the network namespace.
[Backport of net-next 86741ec25462e4c8cdce6df2f41ead05568c7d5e]
Bug: 16355602
Change-Id: I73e1a57dfeedf672f4c2dfc9ce6867838b55974b
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This creates an ioctl named FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_ALLOC which will
preallocate buffers for a given size. Any reads/writes on that
endpoint below that size will use those buffers instead of allocating
their own. If the endpoint is not active, the buffer will not be
allocated until it becomes active.
Change-Id: I4da517620ed913161ea9e21a31f6b92c9a012b44
Signed-off-by: Jerry Zhang <zhangjerry@google.com>
This patch introduces ioctl named FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC, which
returns endpoint descriptor to userspace. It works only if function
is active.
Signed-off-by: Robert Baldyga <r.baldyga@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Jerry Zhang <zhangjerry@google.com>
Change-Id: I55987bf0c6744327f7763b567b5a2b39c50d18e6
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.
===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.
Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.
Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.
Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.
A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchanged
For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.
As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.
This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.
===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.
On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.
If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.
This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.
===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.
pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.
The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchanged
If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!
Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!
You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.
Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.
It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.
An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.
===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.
[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.
[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.
Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2
Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):
/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/
/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;
capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);
printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 58319057b7847667f0c9585b9de0e8932b0fdb08)
Bug: 31038224
Test: Builds.
Change-Id: Ib4ebe89343b032765b3b1dc79dd3817192ad3788
Signed-off-by: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@google.com>
This is needed for MTP to know if writes are aligned to packet size.
Change-Id: If504511e649d46eb8d52f1fafeda071dddeec263
Signed-off-by: Jerry Zhang <zhangjerry@google.com>
(cherry-picked from 9691eac559)
commit 19be0eaffa3ac7d8eb6784ad9bdbc7d67ed8e619 upstream.
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db975 ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3c ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: s/gup.c/memory.c; s/follow_page_pte/follow_page_mask;
s/faultin_page/__get_user_page]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Change-Id: I42e448ecacad4781b460c4c989026307169ba1b5
Bug: 32141528
commit 19be0eaffa3ac7d8eb6784ad9bdbc7d67ed8e619 upstream.
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db975 ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3c ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: s/gup.c/memory.c; s/follow_page_pte/follow_page_mask;
s/faultin_page/__get_user_page]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 69874ec233871a62e1bc8c89e643993af93a8630 upstream.
Add the device ID for the PF of the NFP4000. The device ID for the VF,
0x6003, is already present as PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETRONOME_NFP6000_VF.
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
When moving a group_leader perf event from a software-context
to a hardware-context, there's a race in checking and
updating that context. The existing locking solution
doesn't work; note that it tries to grab a lock inside
the group_leader's context object, which you can only
get at by going through a pointer that should be protected
from these races. To avoid that problem, and to produce
a simple solution, we can just use a lock per group_leader
to protect all checks on the group_leader's context.
The new lock is grabbed and released when no context locks
are held.
Bug: 30955111
Bug: 31095224
Change-Id: If37124c100ca6f4aa962559fba3bd5dbbec8e052
This makes sure that sections generated with -fPIC remain part of the
.rodata section so that the kernel marks it correctly read-only.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Bug: 31703084
Change-Id: I66485b52ba9a801bae614e802a301119f04e507c
This adds the capability for a process that has CAP_NET_ADMIN on
a socket to see the socket mark in socket dumps.
Commit a52e95abf772 ("net: diag: allow socket bytecode filters to
match socket marks") recently gave privileged processes the
ability to filter socket dumps based on mark. This patch is
complementary: it ensures that the mark is also passed to
userspace in the socket's netlink attributes. It is useful for
tools like ss which display information about sockets.
[backport of net-next d545caca827b65aab557a9e9dcdcf1e5a3823c2d]
Change-Id: I0c9708aae5ab8dfa296b8a1e6aecceb2a382415a
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/270210
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This implements SOCK_DESTROY for UDP sockets similar to what was done
for TCP with commit c1e64e298b8ca ("net: diag: Support destroying TCP
sockets.") A process with a UDP socket targeted for destroy is awakened
and recvmsg fails with ECONNABORTED.
[backport of net-next 5d77dca82839ef016a93ad7acd7058b14d967752]
Change-Id: I84e71e774c859002f98dcdb5e0ca01f35227a44c
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This allows a privileged process to filter by socket mark when
dumping sockets via INET_DIAG_BY_FAMILY. This is useful on
systems that use mark-based routing such as Android.
The ability to filter socket marks requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, which
is consistent with other privileged operations allowed by the
SOCK_DIAG interface such as the ability to destroy sockets and
the ability to inspect BPF filters attached to packet sockets.
[backport of net-next a52e95abf772b43c9226e9a72d3c1353903ba96f]
Change-Id: Ic02caf628a71007cc7c48c9da220b4088f5aa4f4
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/261350
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add support to inet_diag facility to filter sockets based on device
index. If an interface index is in the filter only sockets bound
to that index (sk_bound_dev_if) are returned.
[backport of net-next 637c841dd7a5f9bd97b75cbe90b526fa1a52e530]
Change-Id: Ib430cfb44f1b3b1a771a561247ee9140737e52fd
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Removing a bounce buffer copy operation in the pmsg driver path is
always better. We also gain in overall performance by not requesting
a vmalloc on every write as this can cause precious RT tasks, such
as user facing media operation, to stall while memory is being
reclaimed. Added a write_buf_user to the pstore functions, a backup
platform write_buf_user that uses the small buffer that is part of
the instance, and implemented a ramoops write_buf_user that only
supports PSTORE_TYPE_PMSG.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 31057326
Change-Id: I4cdee1cd31467aa3e6c605bce2fbd4de5b0f8caa
The overflow check is required to ensure that user space data
in kernel may not go beyond buffer boundary.
Bug: 28751152
CRs-Fixed: 1064411
Change-Id: I54c28a8942cf1a6a47a4e8272f3159b35d753ead
Signed-off-by: Karthik Reddy Katta <a_katta@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Biswajit Paul <biswajitpaul@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb1fceca22492109be12640d49f5ea5a544c6bb4)
When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the
tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail()
Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb.
If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb.
Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and
we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb)
Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and
access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped,
this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy,
returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug
features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel.
This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller.
Fixes: 6859d49475 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb")
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: I58bb02d6e4e399612e8580b9e02d11e661df82f5
Bug: 31183296
Add support for shortcircuited read/write for files
when enabled through a userspace init option of
FUSE_SHORTCIRCUIT.
When FUSE_SHORTCIRCUIT is enabled all the reads and writes
to the fuse mount point go directly to the native filesystem
rather than through the fuse daemon. All requsts that aren't
read/write still go thought the userspace code.
This allows for significantly better performance on read and writes
and the difference between fuse and the native lower filesystem is
negligible.
Bug: 30222859
Change-Id: I49e21b77813595c2faec6fcba38a74e8f686d020
Signed-off-by: Nikhilesh Reddy <reddyn@codeaurora.org>
commit 1118dce773d84f39ebd51a9fe7261f9169cb056e upstream.
Export these symbols such that UBIFS can implement
->migratepage.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[wt: also add the prototype to include/linux/migrate.h]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3 upstream.
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[wt: no hfi1 subdir in 3.10. A minimal rdma/ib.h had to be created
from 3.11 sources to keep the code similar to mainline]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 8d91f8b15361dfb438ab6eb3b319e2ded43458ff upstream.
@console_may_schedule tracks whether console_sem was acquired through
lock or trylock. If the former, we're inside a sleepable context and
console_conditional_schedule() performs cond_resched(). This allows
console drivers which use console_lock for synchronization to yield
while performing time-consuming operations such as scrolling.
However, the actual console outputting is performed while holding
irq-safe logbuf_lock, so console_unlock() clears @console_may_schedule
before starting outputting lines. Also, only a few drivers call
console_conditional_schedule() to begin with. This means that when a
lot of lines need to be output by console_unlock(), for example on a
console registration, the task doing console_unlock() may not yield for
a long time on a non-preemptible kernel.
If this happens with a slow console devices, for example a serial
console, the outputting task may occupy the cpu for a very long time.
Long enough to trigger softlockup and/or RCU stall warnings, which in
turn pile more messages, sometimes enough to trigger the next cycle of
warnings incapacitating the system.
Fix it by making console_unlock() insert cond_resched() between lines if
@console_may_schedule.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ciwillia@brocade.com: adjust context for 3.10.y]
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <ciwillia@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 759c01142a5d0f364a462346168a56de28a80f52 upstream.
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
CVE-2016-2847
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <3chas3@gmail.com>
commit 7e8b3dfef16375dbfeb1f36a83eb9f27117c51fd upstream.
The HOSTPC extension registers found in some EHCI implementations form
a variable-length array, with one element for each port. Therefore
the hostpc field in struct ehci_regs should be declared as a
zero-length array, not a single-element array.
This fixes a problem reported by UBSAN.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Wilfried Klaebe <linux-kernel@lebenslange-mailadresse.de>
Tested-by: Wilfried Klaebe <linux-kernel@lebenslange-mailadresse.de>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 63ecb81aadf1c823c85c70a2bfd1ec9df3341a72 upstream.
commit d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce upstream
The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a
helper and use that.
Make sure info.name is 0-terminated.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c upstream.
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit fc1221b3a163d1386d1052184202d5dc50d302d1 upstream.
32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once
more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject
well-formed 32bit rulesets.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 7d35812c3214afa5b37a675113555259cfd67b98 upstream.
Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that
the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and
that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule.
Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient.
To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current
checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Currently lsm client data is deallocated when q6lsm_open() fails
which can cause memory corruption if lsm client data is accessed
after freed. Fix this issue by deallocating the client data only
in msm_lsm_close().
Bug: 30142668
Change-Id: If048c26a0ffd8a346a28622183cbf2ba1e7e5ff3
Signed-off-by: Vidyakumar Athota <vathota@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: vivek mehta <mvivek@codeaurora.org>
Vikram reported that his ARM64 compiler managed to 'optimize' away the
preempt_count manipulations in code like:
preempt_enable_no_resched();
put_user();
preempt_disable();
Irrespective of that fact that that is horrible code that should be
fixed for many reasons, it does highlight a deficiency in the generic
preempt_count manipulators. As it is never right to combine/elide
preempt_count manipulations like this.
Therefore sprinkle some volatile in the two generic accessors to
ensure the compiler is aware of the fact that the preempt_count is
observed outside of the regular program-order view and thus cannot be
optimized away like this.
x86; the only arch not using the generic code is not affected as we
do all this in asm in order to use the segment base per-cpu stuff.
Reported-by: Vikram Mulukutla <markivx@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: Vikram Mulukutla <markivx@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a787870924db ("sched, arch: Create asm/preempt.h")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160516131751.GH3205@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Bug: 28705983
(cherry picked from commit 2e636d5e66c35dfcbaf617aa8fa963f6847478fe)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>
Change-Id: I88dec230b1fb14e4bf6e1497d088198feae1cf74
The use of READ_ONCE() causes lots of warnings witht he pending paravirt
spinlock fixes, because those ends up having passing a member to a
'const' structure to READ_ONCE().
There should certainly be nothing wrong with using READ_ONCE() with a
const source, but the helper function __read_once_size() would cause
warnings because it would drop the 'const' qualifier, but also because
the destination would be marked 'const' too due to the use of 'typeof'.
Use a union of types in READ_ONCE() to avoid this issue.
Also make sure to use parenthesis around the macro arguments to avoid
possible operator precedence issues.
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 28705983
(cherry picked from commit dd36929720f40f17685e841ae0d4c581c165ea60)
Change-Id: I73b280cfae42245f6adf6a8e50be7f9177c88ebe
Feedback has shown that WRITE_ONCE(x, val) is easier to use than
ASSIGN_ONCE(val,x).
There are no in-tree users yet, so lets change it for 3.19.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Bug: 28705983
(cherry picked from commit 43239cbe79fc369f5d2160bd7f69e28b5c50a58c)
Change-Id: I10a969447a3aefa87009c244f787da78338af165
ACCESS_ONCE does not work reliably on non-scalar types. For
example gcc 4.6 and 4.7 might remove the volatile tag for such
accesses during the SRA (scalar replacement of aggregates) step
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145)
Let's provide READ_ONCE/ASSIGN_ONCE that will do all accesses via
scalar types as suggested by Linus Torvalds. Accesses larger than
the machines word size cannot be guaranteed to be atomic. These
macros will use memcpy and emit a build warning.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Bug: 28705983
(cherry picked from commit 230fa253df6352af12ad0a16128760b5cb3f92df)
Change-Id: I6235247c7b3a5e14093d477417000ed82f7586a3
Replace the single preempt_count() 'function' that's an lvalue with
two proper functions:
preempt_count() - returns the preempt_count value as rvalue
preempt_count_set() - Allows setting the preempt-count value
Also provide preempt_count_ptr() as a convenience wrapper to implement
all modifying operations.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-orxrbycjozopqfhb4dxdkdvb@git.kernel.org
[ Fixed build failure. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Bug: 28705983
(cherry picked from commit 4a2b4b222743bb07fedf985b884550f2ca067ea9)
Change-Id: I1f74e16f9a30d9fdf5f2439d32853568fa68baaa
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f94 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: 29119002
(cherry picked from commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c)
Signed-off-by: Aarthi Thiruvengadam <athiru@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia374ee061195088f8c777940baa75cedbe897f4e
We want to use network trace events in production
builds, to help diagnose Wifi problems. However, we
don't want to expose raw kernel pointers in such
builds.
Change the format specifier for the skbaddr field,
so that, if kptr_restrict is enabled, the pointers
will be reported as 0.
BUG=30090733
TEST=manual (see below)
Manual test
- Connect device to a wifi network.
$ adb root && adb shell
device# cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
device# echo 1 > events/net/net_dev_xmit/enable
device# echo 1 > events/net/netif_rx/enable
device# echo 1 > tracing_on
device# ping google.com
device# cat trace
- verify that skbaddr is always 0
Change-Id: Ic4bd583d37af6637343601feca875ee24479ddff
Creating devices with the address of the container spmidev is not
indicative of the actual hardware device it represents.
Instead use an unique id to indicate the device it represents.
Bug: 28760543
CRs-Fixed: 1024197
Change-Id: Id18e2a19f4fa1249901a3f275defa8f589270d69
Signed-off-by: Abhijeet Dharmapurikar <adharmap@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Biswajit Paul <biswajitpaul@codeaurora.org>
When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
makes this value the default.
This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN). This version doesn't include making
the variable read-only. It also allows enabling further restriction
at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/11/587
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Bug: 29054680
Change-Id: Iff5bff4fc1042e85866df9faa01bce8d04335ab8
[ Upstream commit 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 ]
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
BUG: 28746669
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
commit 95272c29378ee7dc15f43fa2758cb28a5913a06d upstream.
-ftracer can duplicate asm blocks causing compilation to fail in
noclone functions. For example, KVM declares a global variable
in an asm like
asm("2: ... \n
.pushsection data \n
.global vmx_return \n
vmx_return: .long 2b");
and -ftracer causes a double declaration.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Linda Walsh <lkml@tlinx.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 8a5e5e02fc83aaf67053ab53b359af08c6c49aaf upstream.
Poison pointer values should be small enough to find a room in
non-mmap'able/hardly-mmap'able space. E.g. on x86 "poison pointer space"
is located starting from 0x0. Given unprivileged users cannot mmap
anything below mmap_min_addr, it should be safe to use poison pointers
lower than mmap_min_addr.
The current poison pointer values of LIST_POISON{1,2} might be too big for
mmap_min_addr values equal or less than 1 MB (common case, e.g. Ubuntu
uses only 0x10000). There is little point to use such a big value given
the "poison pointer space" below 1 MB is not yet exhausted. Changing it
to a smaller value solves the problem for small mmap_min_addr setups.
The values are suggested by Solar Designer:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/05/02/6
Signed-off-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 3debb0a9ddb16526de8b456491b7db60114f7b5e upstream.
The trace_printk() code will allocate extra buffers if the compile detects
that a trace_printk() is used. To do this, the format of the trace_printk()
is saved to the __trace_printk_fmt section, and if that section is bigger
than zero, the buffers are allocated (along with a message that this has
happened).
If trace_printk() uses a format that is not a constant, and thus something
not guaranteed to be around when the print happens, the compiler optimizes
the fmt out, as it is not used, and the __trace_printk_fmt section is not
filled. This means the kernel will not allocate the special buffers needed
for the trace_printk() and the trace_printk() will not write anything to the
tracing buffer.
Adding a "__used" to the variable in the __trace_printk_fmt section will
keep it around, even though it is set to NULL. This will keep the string
from being printed in the debugfs/tracing/printk_formats section as it is
not needed.
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Fixes: 07d777fe8c "tracing: Add percpu buffers for trace_printk()"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.5+
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 2fc016c5bd8aad2e201cdf71b9fb4573f94775bd upstream.
Add macros for single bit definitions of a specific type. These are
similar to the BIT() macro that already exists, but with a few
exceptions:
1. The namespace is such that they can be used in uapi definitions.
2. The type is set with the _AC() macro to allow it to be used in
assembly.
3. The type is explicitly specified to be UL or ULL.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-nbca8p7cg6jyjoit7klh3o91@git.kernel.org
[wt: backported to 3.10 only to keep next patch clean]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit b84106b4e2290c081cdab521fa832596cdfea246 upstream.
The PCI config header (first 64 bytes of each device's config space) is
defined by the PCI spec so generic software can identify the device and
manage its usage of I/O, memory, and IRQ resources.
Some non-spec-compliant devices put registers other than BARs where the
BARs should be. When the PCI core sizes these "BARs", the reads and writes
it does may have unwanted side effects, and the "BAR" may appear to
describe non-sensical address space.
Add a flag bit to mark non-compliant devices so we don't touch their BARs.
Turn off IO/MEM decoding to prevent the devices from consuming address
space, since we can't read the BARs to find out what that address space
would be.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Tested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit c4586256f0c440bc2bdb29d2cbb915f0ca785d26 upstream.
Similar to the fix in 40413dcb7b
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, ...) expects the struct to be called struct
x86cpu_device_id, and not struct x86_cpu_id which is what is used in the rest
of the kernel code. Although gcc seems to ignore this error, clang fails
without this define to fix the name.
Code from drivers/thermal/x86_pkg_temp_thermal.c
static const struct x86_cpu_id __initconst pkg_temp_thermal_ids[] = { ... };
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, pkg_temp_thermal_ids);
Error from clang:
drivers/thermal/x86_pkg_temp_thermal.c:577:1: error: variable has
incomplete type 'const struct x86cpu_device_id'
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, pkg_temp_thermal_ids);
^
include/linux/module.h:145:3: note: expanded from macro
'MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE'
MODULE_GENERIC_TABLE(type##_device, name)
^
include/linux/module.h:87:32: note: expanded from macro
'MODULE_GENERIC_TABLE'
extern const struct gtype##_id __mod_##gtype##_table \
^
<scratch space>:143:1: note: expanded from here
__mod_x86cpu_device_table
^
drivers/thermal/x86_pkg_temp_thermal.c:577:1: note: forward declaration of
'struct x86cpu_device_id'
include/linux/module.h:145:3: note: expanded from macro
'MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE'
MODULE_GENERIC_TABLE(type##_device, name)
^
include/linux/module.h:87:21: note: expanded from macro
'MODULE_GENERIC_TABLE'
extern const struct gtype##_id __mod_##gtype##_table \
^
<scratch space>:141:1: note: expanded from here
x86cpu_device_id
^
1 error generated.
Signed-off-by: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: philm@manjaro.org
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit cb984d101b30eb7478d32df56a0023e4603cba7f upstream.
As gcc major version numbers are going to advance rather rapidly in the
future, there's no real value in separate files for each compiler
version.
Deduplicate some of the macros #defined in each file too.
Neaten comments using normal kernel commenting style.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ philm: backport to 3.10-stable ]
Signed-off-by: Philip Mller <philm@manjaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Allows FUSE to report to inotify that it is acting
as a layered filesystem. The userspace component
returns a string representing the location of the
underlying file. If the string cannot be resolved
into a path, the top level path is returned instead.
bug: 23904372
Change-Id: Iabdca0bbedfbff59e9c820c58636a68ef9683d9f
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Add common api support of subsystem restart and bus
bandwidth for dual wifi. This feature redirect the cnss
export api according to the bus type SDIO/PCI.
CRs-Fixed: 986275
Change-Id: Iaf13d6c6d68ef62b7e4f6581899ec8325c5e9696
Signed-off-by: Sarada Prasanna Garnayak <sgarna@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Subsystem device add support for subsystem restart
recovery and ramdump device for cnss firmware dump
collection before the subsystem restart.
Refactor subsystem restart wrapper APIs to avoid the name
space collision in cnss platform driver compilation in dual
WiFi mode.
CRs-Fixed: 983677
Change-Id: Ib4a8d1a6d0ce8f1faa43ce0aa8312823b1ca3c15
Signed-off-by: Sarada Prasanna Garnayak <sgarna@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
PM QoS adds support to improve the wlan throughput.
The cnss platform driver export PM QoS API to wlan
host driver.
Refactor PM QoS wrapper APIs to avoid the name space
collision in cnss platform driver compilation in dual WiFi
mode.
CRs-Fixed: 983653
Change-Id: Id7a486f2f111476e73d5707eba36611a3530e9cf
Signed-off-by: Sarada Prasanna Garnayak <sgarna@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Fix overwrite of updt_params allocated in heap, and stack overread
where param pointer is passed from user space.
Bug: 26876409
Change-Id: Ida8bdb7da2fcb97023dce3b6eafe4b899a51cb66
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Alamanda <arkumar@codeaurora.org>
CONFIG_SDCARD_FS_CI_SEARCH only guards a define for
LOOKUP_CASE_INSENSITIVE, which is never used in the
kernel. Remove both, along with the option matching
that supports it.
Change-Id: I363a8f31de8ee7a7a934d75300cc9ba8176e2edf
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit d4ecd64643a034f9445d6c7c54d247235200098a)
Inotify does not currently know when a filesystem
is acting as a wrapper around another fs. This means
that inotify watchers will miss any modifications to
the base file, as well as any made in a separate
stacked fs that points to the same file.
d_canonical_path solves this problem by allowing the fs
to map a dentry to a path in the lower fs. Inotify
can use it to find the appropriate place to watch to
be informed of all changes to a file.
Change-Id: I09563baffad1711a045e45c1bd0bd8713c2cc0b6
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 223190f1a174b71affbae6d1167fc0b3f0785839)
For controllable output, there are 2 possible bufq under same stream.
When reporting error, use bufq instead of stream to identify correctly.
Update reporting of drop for CDS missing frame by adding new mask.
Bug: 27771328
Bug: 27821985
Change-Id: Ib90ac13509008a3b7689bf41656ba39cc2804831
Signed-off-by: Harsh Shah <harshs@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Ranjith Kagathi Ananda <ranjith@codeaurora.org>
WLAN Functional Drivers Queries cnss platform driver to get the
MAC Address. If the OEM doesn't provide the valid MAC address, the
WLAN Driver fallbacks to use other approaches to get MAC address.
This works under CONFIG_CNSS_MAC feature flag, which will be enabled
only on the OEM platforms. For internal platforms, CNSS driver doesn't
hold any valid mac addresses.
CRs-Fixed: 985585
Change-Id: I1e8a030a32a640cec84cadd6b36b37938d5fe6be
Signed-off-by: Komal Kumar <kseelam@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Some systems can use the normally known u16 alignment of
Ethernet addresses to save some code/text bytes and cycles.
This does not change currently emitted code on x86 by gcc 4.8.
Change-Id: Ic9f5ea49e345bd332bf08e75cd9f4957434fd3f8
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Git-commit: 286ab723d4b83d37deb4017008ef1444a95cfb0d
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linville/wireless-testing.git
[hkadmany@codeaurora.org: trivial conflict fix for 3.14]
Signed-off-by: Hamad Kadmany <hkadmany@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Make PM QoS request API generic to pass the type of latency
requirement needed by the client instead of hard coding
latency type. Add latency type as a function parameter.
CRs-Fixed: 972761
Change-Id: Ic912148d2068fe8a758b6a4b3be570ccf870f03a
Signed-off-by: Sarada Prasanna Garnayak <sgarna@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Add changes to expose dump stack functionality which can be used
by driver to dump stack information when it requires.
CRs-Fixed: 979886
Change-Id: Ib929ad0a510b996ac54d17afd2957ea487c62851
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Singh <absingh@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
The window size used for calculating vm pressure events was
previously fixed at 512 pages. The window size has a big
impact on the rate of notifications sent off to userspace,
in particular when using the "low" level. On machines with
a lot of memory, the current value is likely excessive. On
the other hand, if the window size is too big, we might
delay memory pressure events for too long, especially at
critical levels of memory pressure.
This patch attempts to address that problem with two changes.
The first change is to calculate the window size
based on the machine size, quite similar to how the vm
watermarks are being calculated. This reduces the chance
of false positives at any pressure level. Using the machine
size only makes sense on the root cgroup though; for non-root
cgroups, their hard memory limit is used to calculate the
window size. If no hard memory limit is set, we fall back to
the default window size that was previously used.
The second change is based on an idea from Johannes Weiner, to
only report medium and low pressure levels for every
X windows that we scan. This reduces the frequency with
which we report low/medium pressure levels, but at the same
time will still report critical memory pressure immediately.
Change-Id: Ieffca055b2fb6aa27ae0179e0a588e6fcb173a61
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/2/4/831)
d07e22597d1d355 ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR")
added the ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy
count in generating the random offset to the mmap_base address. The
maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems, but
this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32 bits of
randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible for arm64.
Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally fits with the
mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the same as
get_random_int().
Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
randomization.
Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
appropriate.
Bug: 26963541
Change-Id: I2baedc5b665bbfc763a949512572ace30be56a16
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
This reverts commit 5a707f0972 which is
commit c840ac6af3f8713a71b4d2363419145760bd6044 upstream.
It's been widely reported that this patch breaks existing userspace
applications when backported to the stable kernel releases. As no fix
seems to be forthcoming, just revert it to let systems work again.
Reported-by: "J. Paul Reed" <preed@sigkill.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8244062ef1e54502ef55f54cced659913f244c3e upstream.
For CONFIG_KALLSYMS, we keep two symbol tables and two string tables.
There's one full copy, marked SHF_ALLOC and laid out at the end of the
module's init section. There's also a cut-down version that only
contains core symbols and strings, and lives in the module's core
section.
After module init (and before we free the module memory), we switch
the mod->symtab, mod->num_symtab and mod->strtab to point to the core
versions. We do this under the module_mutex.
However, kallsyms doesn't take the module_mutex: it uses
preempt_disable() and rcu tricks to walk through the modules, because
it's used in the oops path. It's also used in /proc/kallsyms.
There's nothing atomic about the change of these variables, so we can
get the old (larger!) num_symtab and the new symtab pointer; in fact
this is what I saw when trying to reproduce.
By grouping these variables together, we can use a
carefully-dereferenced pointer to ensure we always get one or the
other (the free of the module init section is already done in an RCU
callback, so that's safe). We allocate the init one at the end of the
module init section, and keep the core one inside the struct module
itself (it could also have been allocated at the end of the module
core, but that's probably overkill).
[ Rebased for 4.4-stable and older, because the following changes aren't
in the older trees:
- e0224418516b4d8a6c2160574bac18447c354ef0: adds arg to is_core_symbol
- 7523e4dc5057e157212b4741abd6256e03404cf1: module_init/module_core/init_size/core_size
become init_layout.base/core_layout.base/init_layout.size/core_layout.size.
Original commit: 8244062ef1e54502ef55f54cced659913f244c3e
]
Reported-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111541
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed8b0de5a33d2a2557dce7f9429dca8cb5bc5879 upstream.
"rm -rf" is bricking some peoples' laptops because of variables being
used to store non-reinitializable firmware driver data that's required
to POST the hardware.
These are 100% bugs, and they need to be fixed, but in the mean time it
shouldn't be easy to *accidentally* brick machines.
We have to have delete working, and picking which variables do and don't
work for deletion is quite intractable, so instead make everything
immutable by default (except for a whitelist), and make tools that
aren't quite so broad-spectrum unset the immutable flag.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8282f5d9c17fe15a9e658c06e3f343efae1a2a2f upstream.
All the variables in this list so far are defined to be in the global
namespace in the UEFI spec, so this just further ensures we're
validating the variables we think we are.
Including the guid for entries will become more important in future
patches when we decide whether or not to allow deletion of variables
based on presence in this list.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3dcb1f55dfc7631695e69df4a0d589ce5274bd07 upstream.
Actually translate from ucs2 to utf8 before doing the test, and then
test against our other utf8 data, instead of fudging it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 73500267c930baadadb0d02284909731baf151f7 upstream.
This adds ucs2_utf8size(), which tells us how big our ucs2 string is in
bytes, and ucs2_as_utf8, which translates from ucs2 to utf8..
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc17147de328a74bbdee67c1bf37d2f1992de756 upstream.
Commit f37755490fe9b ("tracepoints: Do not trace when cpu is offline") added
a check to make sure that tracepoints only get called when the cpu is
online, as it uses rcu_read_lock_sched() for protection.
Commit 3a630178fd5f3 ("tracing: generate RCU warnings even when tracepoints
are disabled") added lockdep checks (including rcu checks) for events that
are not enabled to catch possible RCU issues that would only be triggered if
a trace event was enabled. Commit f37755490fe9b only stopped the warnings
when the trace event was enabled but did not prevent warnings if the trace
event was called when disabled.
To fix this, the cpu online check is moved to where the condition is added
to the trace event. This will place the cpu online check in all places that
it may be used now and in the future.
Fixes: f37755490fe9b ("tracepoints: Do not trace when cpu is offline")
Fixes: 3a630178fd5f3 ("tracing: generate RCU warnings even when tracepoints are disabled")
Reported-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ee34ea3a12396f35b26d90a094c75db95080baa upstream.
The id buffer in ata_device is a DMA target, but it isn't explicitly
cacheline aligned. Due to this, adjacent fields can be overwritten with
stale data from memory on non coherent architectures. As a result, the
kernel is sometimes unable to communicate with an ATA device.
Fix this by ensuring that the id buffer is cacheline aligned.
This issue is similar to that fixed by Commit 84bda12af3
("libata: align ap->sector_buf").
Signed-off-by: Harvey Hunt <harvey.hunt@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 287e6611ab1eac76c2c5ebf6e345e04c80ca9c61 upstream.
As reported by Soohoon Lee, the HDIO_GET_32BIT ioctl does not
work correctly in compat mode with libata.
I have investigated the issue further and found multiple problems
that all appeared with the same commit that originally introduced
HDIO_GET_32BIT handling in libata back in linux-2.6.8 and presumably
also linux-2.4, as the code uses "copy_to_user(arg, &val, 1)" to copy
a 'long' variable containing either 0 or 1 to user space.
The problems with this are:
* On big-endian machines, this will always write a zero because it
stores the wrong byte into user space.
* In compat mode, the upper three bytes of the variable are updated
by the compat_hdio_ioctl() function, but they now contain
uninitialized stack data.
* The hdparm tool calling this ioctl uses a 'static long' variable
to store the result. This means at least the upper bytes are
initialized to zero, but calling another ioctl like HDIO_GET_MULTCOUNT
would fill them with data that remains stale when the low byte
is overwritten. Fortunately libata doesn't implement any of the
affected ioctl commands, so this would only happen when we query
both an IDE and an ATA device in the same command such as
"hdparm -N -c /dev/hda /dev/sda"
* The libata code for unknown reasons started using ATA_IOC_GET_IO32
and ATA_IOC_SET_IO32 as aliases for HDIO_GET_32BIT and HDIO_SET_32BIT,
while the ioctl commands that were added later use the normal
HDIO_* names. This is harmless but rather confusing.
This addresses all four issues by changing the code to use put_user()
on an 'unsigned long' variable in HDIO_GET_32BIT, like the IDE subsystem
does, and by clarifying the names of the ioctl commands.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: Soohoon Lee <Soohoon.Lee@f5.com>
Tested-by: Soohoon Lee <Soohoon.Lee@f5.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Define macro to indicate backport support for bssid hint connect
parameter which can be used by driver if the kernel version is
less than 3.15.
Change-Id: Ic8d2f29ca1287df8dedb7927cd444242c6ca1c27
CRs-Fixed: 919601
Signed-off-by: Edhar, Mahesh Kumar <MAHESH@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Komal Seelam <kseelam@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
commit 50ab8ec74a153eb30db26529088bc57dd700b24c upstream.
See http: //www.infradead.org/rpr.html
X-Evolution-Source: 1451162204.2173.11@leira.trondhjem.org
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Mime-Version: 1.0
We support OFFSET_MAX just fine, so don't round down below it. Also
switch to using min_t to make the helper more readable.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: 433c92379d ("NFS: Clean up nfs_size_to_loff_t()")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5e1033561da1152c57b97ee84371dba2b3d64c25 upstream.
KASAN found that our additional element processing scripts drop off
the end of the VPD page into unallocated space. The reason is that
not every element has additional information but our traversal
routines think they do, leading to them expecting far more additional
information than is present. Fix this by adding a gate to the
traversal routine so that it only processes elements that are expected
to have additional information (list is in SES-2 section 6.1.13.1:
Additional Element Status diagnostic page overview)
Reported-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Tested-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0ad95472bf169a3501991f8f33f5147f792a8116 upstream.
Commit cb7323fffa ("lockd: create and use per-net NSM
RPC clients on MON/UNMON requests") introduced per-net
NSM RPC clients. Unfortunately this doesn't make any sense
without per-net nsm_handle.
E.g. the following scenario could happen
Two hosts (X and Y) in different namespaces (A and B) share
the same nsm struct.
1. nsm_monitor(host_X) called => NSM rpc client created,
nsm->sm_monitored bit set.
2. nsm_mointor(host-Y) called => nsm->sm_monitored already set,
we just exit. Thus in namespace B ln->nsm_clnt == NULL.
3. host X destroyed => nsm->sm_count decremented to 1
4. host Y destroyed => nsm_unmonitor() => nsm_mon_unmon() => NULL-ptr
dereference of *ln->nsm_clnt
So this could be fixed by making per-net nsm_handles list,
instead of global. Thus different net namespaces will not be able
share the same nsm_handle.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 upstream.
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f37755490fe9bf76f6ba1d8c6591745d3574a6a6 upstream.
The tracepoint infrastructure uses RCU sched protection to enable and
disable tracepoints safely. There are some instances where tracepoints are
used in infrastructure code (like kfree()) that get called after a CPU is
going offline, and perhaps when it is coming back online but hasn't been
registered yet.
This can probuce the following warning:
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.4.0-00006-g0fe53e8-dirty #34 Tainted: G S
-------------------------------
include/trace/events/kmem.h:141 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
RCU used illegally from offline CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by swapper/8/0.
stack backtrace:
CPU: 8 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/8 Tainted: G S 4.4.0-00006-g0fe53e8-dirty #34
Call Trace:
[c0000005b76c78d0] [c0000000008b9540] .dump_stack+0x98/0xd4 (unreliable)
[c0000005b76c7950] [c00000000010c898] .lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x108/0x170
[c0000005b76c79e0] [c00000000029adc0] .kfree+0x390/0x440
[c0000005b76c7a80] [c000000000055f74] .destroy_context+0x44/0x100
[c0000005b76c7b00] [c0000000000934a0] .__mmdrop+0x60/0x150
[c0000005b76c7b90] [c0000000000e3ff0] .idle_task_exit+0x130/0x140
[c0000005b76c7c20] [c000000000075804] .pseries_mach_cpu_die+0x64/0x310
[c0000005b76c7cd0] [c000000000043e7c] .cpu_die+0x3c/0x60
[c0000005b76c7d40] [c0000000000188d8] .arch_cpu_idle_dead+0x28/0x40
[c0000005b76c7db0] [c000000000101e6c] .cpu_startup_entry+0x50c/0x560
[c0000005b76c7ed0] [c000000000043bd8] .start_secondary+0x328/0x360
[c0000005b76c7f90] [c000000000008a6c] start_secondary_prolog+0x10/0x14
This warning is not a false positive either. RCU is not protecting code that
is being executed while the CPU is offline.
Instead of playing "whack-a-mole(TM)" and adding conditional statements to
the tracepoints we find that are used in this instance, simply add a
cpu_online() test to the tracepoint code where the tracepoint will be
ignored if the CPU is offline.
Use of raw_smp_processor_id() is fine, as there should never be a case where
the tracepoint code goes from running on a CPU that is online and suddenly
gets migrated to a CPU that is offline.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455387773-4245-1-git-send-email-kda@linux-powerpc.org
Reported-by: Denis Kirjanov <kda@linux-powerpc.org>
Fixes: 97e1c18e8d ("tracing: Kernel Tracepoints")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add a validation check for dentries for encrypted directory to make
sure we're not caching stale data after a key has been added or removed.
Also check to make sure that status of the encryption key is updated
when readdir(2) is executed.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic7a90d79d9447272fc512ae2abbd299523de02b8
The statistics are provided in /proc/<pid>/cpufreq_stats as a read-only
interface. This gives the amount of time spent by a task/process in
each of the frequencies on each of the CPUs. The cat output will have
"<cpu> <frequency> <time>" triplet in each line, which will mean that
a given task spent <time> usertime units of time at <frequency> on
CPU <cpu>. usertime units here is 10mS (similar to other time exported
in /proc). The statistics are available during the lifetime of the
tasks/processes.
Change-Id: I3ebb338c27020aabd6b4e258bd26981c51a57771
commit 732042821cfa106b3c20b9780e4c60fee9d68900 upstream.
Helper radix_tree_iter_retry() resets next_index to the current index.
In following radix_tree_next_slot current chunk size becomes zero. This
isn't checked and it tries to dereference null pointer in slot.
Tagged iterator is fine because retry happens only at slot 0 where tag
bitmask in iter->tags is filled with single bit.
Fixes: 46437f9a554f ("radix-tree: fix race in gang lookup")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ohad Ben-Cohen <ohad@wizery.com>
Cc: Jeremiah Mahler <jmmahler@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 46437f9a554fbe3e110580ca08ab703b59f2f95a upstream.
If the indirect_ptr bit is set on a slot, that indicates we need to redo
the lookup. Introduce a new function radix_tree_iter_retry() which
forces the loop to retry the lookup by setting 'slot' to NULL and
turning the iterator back to point at the problematic entry.
This is a pretty rare problem to hit at the moment; the lookup has to
race with a grow of the radix tree from a height of 0. The consequences
of hitting this race are that gang lookup could return a pointer to a
radix_tree_node instead of a pointer to whatever the user had inserted
in the tree.
Fixes: cebbd29e1c ("radix-tree: rewrite gang lookup using iterator")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ohad Ben-Cohen <ohad@wizery.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b33c8ff4431a343561e2319f17c14286f2aa52e2 upstream.
In my randconfig tests, I came across a bug that involves several
components:
* gcc-4.9 through at least 5.3
* CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL enabling -fprofile-arcs for all files
* CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES overriding every if()
* The optimized implementation of do_div() that tries to
replace a library call with an division by multiplication
* code in drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.c doing
u32 adc_clock = 450560; /* 45.056 MHz */
if (state->config.adc_clock)
adc_clock = state->config.adc_clock;
do_div(value, adc_clock);
In this case, gcc fails to determine whether the divisor
in do_div() is __builtin_constant_p(). In particular, it
concludes that __builtin_constant_p(adc_clock) is false, while
__builtin_constant_p(!!adc_clock) is true.
That in turn throws off the logic in do_div() that also uses
__builtin_constant_p(), and instead of picking either the
constant- optimized division, and the code in ilog2() that uses
__builtin_constant_p() to figure out whether it knows the answer at
compile time. The result is a link error from failing to find
multiple symbols that should never have been called based on
the __builtin_constant_p():
dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `____ilog2_NaN'
dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `__aeabi_uldivmod'
ERROR: "____ilog2_NaN" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "__aeabi_uldivmod" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!
This patch avoids the problem by changing __trace_if() to check
whether the condition is known at compile-time to be nonzero, rather
than checking whether it is actually a constant.
I see this one link error in roughly one out of 1600 randconfig builds
on ARM, and the patch fixes all known instances.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455312410-1058841-1-git-send-email-arnd@arndb.de
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Fixes: ab3c9c686e ("branch tracer, intel-iommu: fix build with CONFIG_BRANCH_TRACER=y")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1f55c718c290616889c04946864a13ef30f64929 upstream.
Considering current pty code and multiple devpts instances, it's possible
to umount a devpts file system while a program still has /dev/tty opened
pointing to a previosuly closed pty pair in that instance. In the case all
ptmx and pts/N files are closed, umount can be done. If the program closes
/dev/tty after umount is done, devpts_kill_index will use now an invalid
super_block, which was already destroyed in the umount operation after
running ->kill_sb. This is another "use after free" type of issue, but now
related to the allocated super_block instance.
To avoid the problem (warning at ida_remove and potential crashes) for
this specific case, I added two functions in devpts which grabs additional
references to the super_block, which pty code now uses so it makes sure
the super block structure is still valid until pty shutdown is done.
I also moved the additional inode references to the same functions, which
also covered similar case with inode being freed before /dev/tty final
close/shutdown.
Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c840ac6af3f8713a71b4d2363419145760bd6044 upstream.
Each af_alg parent socket obtained by socket(2) corresponds to a
tfm object once bind(2) has succeeded. An accept(2) call on that
parent socket creates a context which then uses the tfm object.
Therefore as long as any child sockets created by accept(2) exist
the parent socket must not be modified or freed.
This patch guarantees this by using locks and a reference count
on the parent socket. Any attempt to modify the parent socket will
fail with EBUSY.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9d8a765211335cfdad464b90fb19f546af5706ae upstream.
sigsuspend() is nowhere used except in signal.c itself, so we can mark it
static do not pollute the global namespace.
But this patch is more than a boring cleanup patch, it fixes a real issue
on UserModeLinux. UML has a special console driver to display ttys using
xterm, or other terminal emulators, on the host side. Vegard reported
that sometimes UML is unable to spawn a xterm and he's facing the
following warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 908 at include/linux/thread_info.h:128 sigsuspend+0xab/0xc0()
It turned out that this warning makes absolutely no sense as the UML
xterm code calls sigsuspend() on the host side, at least it tries. But
as the kernel itself offers a sigsuspend() symbol the linker choose this
one instead of the glibc wrapper. Interestingly this code used to work
since ever but always blocked signals on the wrong side. Some recent
kernel change made the WARN_ON() trigger and uncovered the bug.
It is a wonderful example of how much works by chance on computers. :-)
Fixes: 68f3f16d9a ("new helper: sigsuspend()")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The element ID list is currently almost sorted by amendment
or similar topic, but the order is difficult to maintain and
not very transparent. Sort the list by ID instead, and add
a lot of missing IDs.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Git-commit: 8c78e38025060a00155a73bf722152c156242490
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Change-Id: I080099705fae20a477cfd4b04bfb65e9dfc7bef6
CRs-fixed: 969965
[vidyullatha@codeaurora.org: backport to 3.10 - This commit
includes the changes in enum ieee80211_eid to add a number
of missing IDs].
Signed-off-by: Vidyullatha Kanchanapally <vidyullatha@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Separate the WLAN CNSS platform driver according to
the bus interface PCIe and SDIO. Add separate Kernel
Config file for the WLAN CNSS platform Driver and its
necessary module which has support for the CNSS
connectivity Subsystem.
Add Kernel Config flag to refactoring the CNSS platform Driver:
CONFIG_CNSS Kernel Config add support to CNSS Core
driver compilation and export Generic GPL wrappers.
CONFIG_CNSS_SDIO Kernel Config add support to CNSS
Platform Driver compilation for SDIO based WiFi Devices
and export platform driver API's based on the SDIO bus.
CONFIG_CNSS_PCI Kernel Config add support to CNSS
Platform Driver compilation for PCIe based WiFi Devices
and export platform driver API's based on the PCIe bus.
CRs-fixed: 939171
Change-Id: I8cce5bbc87e6742179a7967ccba295f55c444b28
Signed-off-by: Kai Liu <kaliu@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sarada Prasanna Garnayak <sgarna@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Amarnath Hullur Subramanyam <amarnath@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Since there are frequency bands (e.g. 5.9GHz) allowing channels
with only 10 or 5 MHz bandwidth, this patch adds attributes that
allow keeping track about this information.
When channel attributes are reported to user-space, make sure to
not break old tools, i.e. if the 'split wiphy dump' is enabled,
report the extra attributes (if present) describing the bandwidth
restrictions. If the 'split wiphy dump' is not enabled,
completely omit those channels that have flags set to either
IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_10MHZ or IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_20MHZ.
Add the check for new bandwidth restriction flags in
cfg80211_chandef_usable() to comply with the restrictions.
Signed-off-by: Rostislav Lisovy <rostislav.lisovy@fel.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Git-commit: ea077c1cea36a6b5ded1256dcd56c72ff2a22c62
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Change-Id: I8610e5a7594099a99a28b699c42c40a2a62ab397
CRs-Fixed: 754373
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ahn <sahn@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sunil Dutt <usdutt@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Amarnath Hullur Subramanyam <amarnath@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06af1c52c9ea234e0b1266cc0b52c3e0c6c8fe9f)
The current lz4 compress buffer is 16kb on 32-bits, 32kb on 64-bits
system. But, lz4 needs only 16kb on both. On 64-bits, this causes
wasted cpu cycles for additional memset during every compression.
In case of lz4hc, the current buffer size is (256kb + 8) on 32-bits,
(512kb + 16) on 64-bits. But, lz4hc needs only (256kb + 2 * pointer) on
both.
This patch fixes these wrong compress buffer sizes for 64-bits.
Signed-off-by: Bongkyu Kim <bongkyu.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>
Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Adds nanohub kernel driver files as well as device tree configuration to
use nanohub instead of contexthub (spich)
Change-Id: I089dd5c3a08968a002e965e8d1ed260b93e32ce3
Signed-off-by: Ben Fennema <fennema@google.com>
commit fbc416ff86183e2203cdf975e2881d7c164b0271 upstream.
As reported by Michal Simek, building an ARM64 kernel with CONFIG_UID16
disabled currently fails because the system call table still needs to
reference the individual function entry points that are provided by
kernel/sys_ni.c in this case, and the declarations are hidden inside
of #ifdef CONFIG_UID16:
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h:57:8: error: 'sys_lchown16' undeclared here (not in a function)
__SYSCALL(__NR_lchown, sys_lchown16)
I believe this problem only exists on ARM64, because older architectures
tend to not need declarations when their system call table is built
in assembly code, while newer architectures tend to not need UID16
support. ARM64 only uses these system calls for compatibility with
32-bit ARM binaries.
This changes the CONFIG_UID16 check into CONFIG_HAVE_UID16, which is
set unconditionally on ARM64 with CONFIG_COMPAT, so we see the
declarations whenever we need them, but otherwise the behavior is
unchanged.
Fixes: af1839eb4b ("Kconfig: clean up the long arch list for the UID16 config option")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593 ]
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This implements SOCK_DESTROY for TCP sockets. It causes all
blocking calls on the socket to fail fast with ECONNABORTED and
causes a protocol close of the socket. It informs the other end
of the connection by sending a RST, i.e., initiating a TCP ABORT
as per RFC 793. ECONNABORTED was chosen for consistency with
FreeBSD.
[Backport of net-next c1e64e298b8cad309091b95d8436a0255c84f54a]
Change-Id: Ice9aad37741fe497341d1d2a51e0b70601a99c90
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This passes the SOCK_DESTROY operation to the underlying protocol
diag handler, or returns -EOPNOTSUPP if that handler does not
define a destroy operation.
Most of this patch is just renaming functions. This is not
strictly necessary, but it would be fairly counterintuitive to
have the code to destroy inet sockets be in a function whose name
starts with inet_diag_get.
[Backport of net-next 6eb5d2e08f071c05ecbe135369c9ad418826cab2]
Change-Id: Iee2c858bf11c48f54890b85b87821a2a2d7109e1
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds a SOCK_DESTROY operation, a destroy function
pointer to sock_diag_handler, and a diag_destroy function
pointer. It does not include any implementation code.
[Backport of net-next 64be0aed59ad519d6f2160868734f7e278290ac1]
Change-Id: I3db262a7e41f1f8452ff0968d4001234598190d8
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, inet_diag_dump_one_icsk finds a socket and then dumps
its information to userspace. Split it into a part that finds the
socket and a part that dumps the information.
[Backport of net-next b613f56ec9baf30edf5d9d607b822532a273dad7]
Change-Id: I7aec27aca9c3e395e41332fe4e59d720042e0609
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ Upstream commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 ]
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c90170283a9855d1db4fe81934dddce648 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy
related to disabling sock timestamp.
When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags
but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag
was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever
such clones were closed.
The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with
that flag on, like tcp does.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ad87e03213b552a5c33d5e1e7a19a73768397010 upstream.
Some USB device / host controller combinations seem to have problems
with Link Power Management. For example, Steinar found that his xHCI
controller wouldn't handle bandwidth calculations correctly for two
video cards simultaneously when LPM was enabled, even though the bus
had plenty of bandwidth available.
This patch introduces a new quirk flag for devices that should remain
disabled for LPM, and creates quirk entries for Steinar's devices.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Steinar H. Gunderson <sgunderson@bigfoot.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4327ba52afd03fc4b5afa0ee1d774c9c5b0e85c5 upstream.
If a EXT4 filesystem utilizes JBD2 journaling and an error occurs, the
journaling will be aborted first and the error number will be recorded
into JBD2 superblock and, finally, the system will enter into the
panic state in "errors=panic" option. But, in the rare case, this
sequence is little twisted like the below figure and it will happen
that the system enters into panic state, which means the system reset
in mobile environment, before completion of recording an error in the
journal superblock. In this case, e2fsck cannot recognize that the
filesystem failure occurred in the previous run and the corruption
wouldn't be fixed.
Task A Task B
ext4_handle_error()
-> jbd2_journal_abort()
-> __journal_abort_soft()
-> __jbd2_journal_abort_hard()
| -> journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT;
|
| __ext4_abort()
| -> jbd2_journal_abort()
| | -> __journal_abort_soft()
| | -> if (journal->j_flags & JBD2_ABORT)
| | return;
| -> panic()
|
-> jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno()
Tested-by: Hobin Woo <hobin.woo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong <daeho.jeong@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 264640fc2c5f4f913db5c73fa3eb1ead2c45e9d7 ]
If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which
has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and
received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some
fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the
underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in
ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue.
To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to
match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local
addresses.
Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/
but got lost and forgotten for some reason.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c ]
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f94 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/21/337)
ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the
mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to
prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such
a way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all
platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that
platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place
the trade-off.
Bug: 24047224
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Change-Id: I66ac01c6f4f2c8dcfc84d1f1e99490b8385b3ed4
Add support for filesystem stacked read/write of files
when enabled through a userspace init option of FUSE_STACKED_IO.
When FUSE_STACKED_IO is enabled all the reads and writes
to the fuse mount point go directly to the native filesystem
rather than through the fuse daemon. All requests that aren't
read/write still go thought the userspace code.
Mmaped I/O is still not supported through stacking and can be
added in.
This allows for significantly better performance on read and writes.
The difference in performance between fuse and the native lower
filesystem is negligible.
There is also a significant cpu/power savings that is achieved which
is really important on embedded systems that use fuse for I/O
Change-Id: Ic2e6b69df5acd92844999a0b7dd9c1c1db185d50
Signed-off-by: Nikhilesh Reddy <reddyn@codeaurora.org>
Poison pointer values should be small enough to find a room in
non-mmap'able/hardly-mmap'able space. E.g. on x86 "poison pointer space"
is located starting from 0x0. Given unprivileged users cannot mmap
anything below mmap_min_addr, it should be safe to use poison pointers
lower than mmap_min_addr.
The current poison pointer values of LIST_POISON{1,2} might be too big for
mmap_min_addr values equal or less than 1 MB (common case, e.g. Ubuntu
uses only 0x10000). There is little point to use such a big value given
the "poison pointer space" below 1 MB is not yet exhausted. Changing it
to a smaller value solves the problem for small mmap_min_addr setups.
The values are suggested by Solar Designer:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/05/02/6
Bug: 26186802
Change-Id: I829d12b95c4793edec07d97d47a3986fd96bedd4
Signed-off-by: Yuan Lin <yualin@google.com>
When studying page stealing, I noticed some weird looking decisions in
try_to_steal_freepages(). The first I assume is a bug (Patch 1), the
following two patches were driven by evaluation.
Testing was done with stress-highalloc of mmtests, using the
mm_page_alloc_extfrag tracepoint and postprocessing to get counts of how
often page stealing occurs for individual migratetypes, and what
migratetypes are used for fallbacks. Arguably, the worst case of page
stealing is when UNMOVABLE allocation steals from MOVABLE pageblock.
RECLAIMABLE allocation stealing from MOVABLE allocation is also not ideal,
so the goal is to minimize these two cases.
The evaluation of v2 wasn't always clear win and Joonsoo questioned the
results. Here I used different baseline which includes RFC compaction
improvements from [1]. I found that the compaction improvements reduce
variability of stress-highalloc, so there's less noise in the data.
First, let's look at stress-highalloc configured to do sync compaction,
and how these patches reduce page stealing events during the test. First
column is after fresh reboot, other two are reiterations of test without
reboot. That was all accumulater over 5 re-iterations (so the benchmark
was run 5x3 times with 5 fresh restarts).
Baseline:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
5-nothp-1 5-nothp-2 5-nothp-3
Page alloc extfrag event 10264225 8702233 10244125
Extfrag fragmenting 10263271 8701552 10243473
Extfrag fragmenting for unmovable 13595 17616 15960
Extfrag fragmenting unmovable placed with movable 7989 12193 8447
Extfrag fragmenting for reclaimable 658 1840 1817
Extfrag fragmenting reclaimable placed with movable 558 1677 1679
Extfrag fragmenting for movable 10249018 8682096 10225696
With Patch 1:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
6-nothp-1 6-nothp-2 6-nothp-3
Page alloc extfrag event 11834954 9877523 9774860
Extfrag fragmenting 11833993 9876880 9774245
Extfrag fragmenting for unmovable 7342 16129 11712
Extfrag fragmenting unmovable placed with movable 4191 10547 6270
Extfrag fragmenting for reclaimable 373 1130 923
Extfrag fragmenting reclaimable placed with movable 302 906 738
Extfrag fragmenting for movable 11826278 9859621 9761610
With Patch 2:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
7-nothp-1 7-nothp-2 7-nothp-3
Page alloc extfrag event 4725990 3668793 3807436
Extfrag fragmenting 4725104 3668252 3806898
Extfrag fragmenting for unmovable 6678 7974 7281
Extfrag fragmenting unmovable placed with movable 2051 3829 4017
Extfrag fragmenting for reclaimable 429 1208 1278
Extfrag fragmenting reclaimable placed with movable 369 976 1034
Extfrag fragmenting for movable 4717997 3659070 3798339
With Patch 3:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
8-nothp-1 8-nothp-2 8-nothp-3
Page alloc extfrag event 5016183 4700142 3850633
Extfrag fragmenting 5015325 4699613 3850072
Extfrag fragmenting for unmovable 1312 3154 3088
Extfrag fragmenting unmovable placed with movable 1115 2777 2714
Extfrag fragmenting for reclaimable 437 1193 1097
Extfrag fragmenting reclaimable placed with movable 330 969 879
Extfrag fragmenting for movable 5013576 4695266 3845887
In v2 we've seen apparent regression with Patch 1 for unmovable events,
this is now gone, suggesting it was indeed noise. Here, each patch
improves the situation for unmovable events. Reclaimable is improved by
patch 1 and then either the same modulo noise, or perhaps sligtly worse -
a small price for unmovable improvements, IMHO. The number of movable
allocations falling back to other migratetypes is most noisy, but it's
reduced to half at Patch 2 nevertheless. These are least critical as
compaction can move them around.
If we look at success rates, the patches don't affect them, that didn't change.
Baseline:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
5-nothp-1 5-nothp-2 5-nothp-3
Success 1 Min 49.00 ( 0.00%) 42.00 ( 14.29%) 41.00 ( 16.33%)
Success 1 Mean 51.00 ( 0.00%) 45.00 ( 11.76%) 42.60 ( 16.47%)
Success 1 Max 55.00 ( 0.00%) 51.00 ( 7.27%) 46.00 ( 16.36%)
Success 2 Min 53.00 ( 0.00%) 47.00 ( 11.32%) 44.00 ( 16.98%)
Success 2 Mean 59.60 ( 0.00%) 50.80 ( 14.77%) 48.20 ( 19.13%)
Success 2 Max 64.00 ( 0.00%) 56.00 ( 12.50%) 52.00 ( 18.75%)
Success 3 Min 84.00 ( 0.00%) 82.00 ( 2.38%) 78.00 ( 7.14%)
Success 3 Mean 85.60 ( 0.00%) 82.80 ( 3.27%) 79.40 ( 7.24%)
Success 3 Max 86.00 ( 0.00%) 83.00 ( 3.49%) 80.00 ( 6.98%)
Patch 1:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
6-nothp-1 6-nothp-2 6-nothp-3
Success 1 Min 49.00 ( 0.00%) 44.00 ( 10.20%) 44.00 ( 10.20%)
Success 1 Mean 51.80 ( 0.00%) 46.00 ( 11.20%) 45.80 ( 11.58%)
Success 1 Max 54.00 ( 0.00%) 49.00 ( 9.26%) 49.00 ( 9.26%)
Success 2 Min 58.00 ( 0.00%) 49.00 ( 15.52%) 48.00 ( 17.24%)
Success 2 Mean 60.40 ( 0.00%) 51.80 ( 14.24%) 50.80 ( 15.89%)
Success 2 Max 63.00 ( 0.00%) 54.00 ( 14.29%) 55.00 ( 12.70%)
Success 3 Min 84.00 ( 0.00%) 81.00 ( 3.57%) 79.00 ( 5.95%)
Success 3 Mean 85.00 ( 0.00%) 81.60 ( 4.00%) 79.80 ( 6.12%)
Success 3 Max 86.00 ( 0.00%) 82.00 ( 4.65%) 82.00 ( 4.65%)
Patch 2:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
7-nothp-1 7-nothp-2 7-nothp-3
Success 1 Min 50.00 ( 0.00%) 44.00 ( 12.00%) 39.00 ( 22.00%)
Success 1 Mean 52.80 ( 0.00%) 45.60 ( 13.64%) 42.40 ( 19.70%)
Success 1 Max 55.00 ( 0.00%) 46.00 ( 16.36%) 47.00 ( 14.55%)
Success 2 Min 52.00 ( 0.00%) 48.00 ( 7.69%) 45.00 ( 13.46%)
Success 2 Mean 53.40 ( 0.00%) 49.80 ( 6.74%) 48.80 ( 8.61%)
Success 2 Max 57.00 ( 0.00%) 52.00 ( 8.77%) 52.00 ( 8.77%)
Success 3 Min 84.00 ( 0.00%) 81.00 ( 3.57%) 79.00 ( 5.95%)
Success 3 Mean 85.00 ( 0.00%) 82.40 ( 3.06%) 79.60 ( 6.35%)
Success 3 Max 86.00 ( 0.00%) 83.00 ( 3.49%) 80.00 ( 6.98%)
Patch 3:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
8-nothp-1 8-nothp-2 8-nothp-3
Success 1 Min 46.00 ( 0.00%) 44.00 ( 4.35%) 42.00 ( 8.70%)
Success 1 Mean 50.20 ( 0.00%) 45.60 ( 9.16%) 44.00 ( 12.35%)
Success 1 Max 52.00 ( 0.00%) 47.00 ( 9.62%) 47.00 ( 9.62%)
Success 2 Min 53.00 ( 0.00%) 49.00 ( 7.55%) 48.00 ( 9.43%)
Success 2 Mean 55.80 ( 0.00%) 50.60 ( 9.32%) 49.00 ( 12.19%)
Success 2 Max 59.00 ( 0.00%) 52.00 ( 11.86%) 51.00 ( 13.56%)
Success 3 Min 84.00 ( 0.00%) 80.00 ( 4.76%) 79.00 ( 5.95%)
Success 3 Mean 85.40 ( 0.00%) 81.60 ( 4.45%) 80.40 ( 5.85%)
Success 3 Max 87.00 ( 0.00%) 83.00 ( 4.60%) 82.00 ( 5.75%)
While there's no improvement here, I consider reduced fragmentation events
to be worth on its own. Patch 2 also seems to reduce scanning for free
pages, and migrations in compaction, suggesting it has somewhat less work
to do:
Patch 1:
Compaction stalls 4153 3959 3978
Compaction success 1523 1441 1446
Compaction failures 2630 2517 2531
Page migrate success 4600827 4943120 5104348
Page migrate failure 19763 16656 17806
Compaction pages isolated 9597640 10305617 10653541
Compaction migrate scanned 77828948 86533283 87137064
Compaction free scanned 517758295 521312840 521462251
Compaction cost 5503 5932 6110
Patch 2:
Compaction stalls 3800 3450 3518
Compaction success 1421 1316 1317
Compaction failures 2379 2134 2201
Page migrate success 4160421 4502708 4752148
Page migrate failure 19705 14340 14911
Compaction pages isolated 8731983 9382374 9910043
Compaction migrate scanned 98362797 96349194 98609686
Compaction free scanned 496512560 469502017 480442545
Compaction cost 5173 5526 5811
As with v2, /proc/pagetypeinfo appears unaffected with respect to numbers
of unmovable and reclaimable pageblocks.
Configuring the benchmark to allocate like THP page fault (i.e. no sync
compaction) gives much noisier results for iterations 2 and 3 after
reboot. This is not so surprising given how [1] offers lower improvements
in this scenario due to less restarts after deferred compaction which
would change compaction pivot.
Baseline:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
5-thp-1 5-thp-2 5-thp-3
Page alloc extfrag event 8148965 6227815 6646741
Extfrag fragmenting 8147872 6227130 6646117
Extfrag fragmenting for unmovable 10324 12942 15975
Extfrag fragmenting unmovable placed with movable 5972 8495 10907
Extfrag fragmenting for reclaimable 601 1707 2210
Extfrag fragmenting reclaimable placed with movable 520 1570 2000
Extfrag fragmenting for movable 8136947 6212481 6627932
Patch 1:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
6-thp-1 6-thp-2 6-thp-3
Page alloc extfrag event 8345457 7574471 7020419
Extfrag fragmenting 8343546 7573777 7019718
Extfrag fragmenting for unmovable 10256 18535 30716
Extfrag fragmenting unmovable placed with movable 6893 11726 22181
Extfrag fragmenting for reclaimable 465 1208 1023
Extfrag fragmenting reclaimable placed with movable 353 996 843
Extfrag fragmenting for movable 8332825 7554034 6987979
Patch 2:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
7-thp-1 7-thp-2 7-thp-3
Page alloc extfrag event 3512847 3020756 2891625
Extfrag fragmenting 3511940 3020185 2891059
Extfrag fragmenting for unmovable 9017 6892 6191
Extfrag fragmenting unmovable placed with movable 1524 3053 2435
Extfrag fragmenting for reclaimable 445 1081 1160
Extfrag fragmenting reclaimable placed with movable 375 918 986
Extfrag fragmenting for movable 3502478 3012212 2883708
Patch 3:
3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4 3.19-rc4
8-thp-1 8-thp-2 8-thp-3
Page alloc extfrag event 3181699 3082881 2674164
Extfrag fragmenting 3180812 3082303 2673611
Extfrag fragmenting for unmovable 1201 4031 4040
Extfrag fragmenting unmovable placed with movable 974 3611 3645
Extfrag fragmenting for reclaimable 478 1165 1294
Extfrag fragmenting reclaimable placed with movable 387 985 1030
Extfrag fragmenting for movable 3179133 3077107 2668277
The improvements for first iteration are clear, the rest is much noisier
and can appear like regression for Patch 1. Anyway, patch 2 rectifies it.
Allocation success rates are again unaffected so there's no point in
making this e-mail any longer.
[1] http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=142166196321125&w=2
This patch (of 3):
When __rmqueue_fallback() is called to allocate a page of order X, it will
find a page of order Y >= X of a fallback migratetype, which is different
from the desired migratetype. With the help of try_to_steal_freepages(),
it may change the migratetype (to the desired one) also of:
1) all currently free pages in the pageblock containing the fallback page
2) the fallback pageblock itself
3) buddy pages created by splitting the fallback page (when Y > X)
These decisions take the order Y into account, as well as the desired
migratetype, with the goal of preventing multiple fallback allocations
that could e.g. distribute UNMOVABLE allocations among multiple
pageblocks.
Originally, decision for 1) has implied the decision for 3). Commit
47118af076 ("mm: mmzone: MIGRATE_CMA migration type added") changed that
(probably unintentionally) so that the buddy pages in case 3) are always
changed to the desired migratetype, except for CMA pageblocks.
Commit fef903efcf0c ("mm/page_allo.c: restructure free-page stealing code
and fix a bug") did some refactoring and added a comment that the case of
3) is intended. Commit 0cbef29a7821 ("mm: __rmqueue_fallback() should
respect pageblock type") removed the comment and tried to restore the
original behavior where 1) implies 3), but due to the previous
refactoring, the result is instead that only 2) implies 3) - and the
conditions for 2) are less frequently met than conditions for 1). This
may increase fragmentation in situations where the code decides to steal
all free pages from the pageblock (case 1)), but then gives back the buddy
pages produced by splitting.
This patch restores the original intended logic where 1) implies 3).
During testing with stress-highalloc from mmtests, this has shown to
decrease the number of events where UNMOVABLE and RECLAIMABLE allocations
steal from MOVABLE pageblocks, which can lead to permanent fragmentation.
In some cases it has increased the number of events when MOVABLE
allocations steal from UNMOVABLE or RECLAIMABLE pageblocks, but these are
fixable by sync compaction and thus less harmful.
Note that evaluation has shown that the behavior introduced by
47118af076 for buddy pages in case 3) is actually even better than the
original logic, so the following patch will introduce it properly once
again. For stable backports of this patch it makes thus sense to only fix
versions containing 0cbef29a7821.
[iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com: tracepoint fix]
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.13+ containing 0cbef29a7821]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Eric Dumazet