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Merge 3.10.108 into android-msm-bullhead-3.10-oreo-m5
Changes in 3.10.108: (141 commits)
ipvs: SNAT packet replies only for NATed connections
net: reduce skb_warn_bad_offload() noise
net: skb_needs_check() accepts CHECKSUM_NONE for tx
Staging: comedi: comedi_fops: Avoid orphaned proc entry
udp: consistently apply ufo or fragmentation
Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
Bluetooth: cmtp: cmtp_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
tcp: introduce tcp_rto_delta_us() helper for xmit timer fix
tcp: enable xmit timer fix by having TLP use time when RTO should fire
tcp: fix xmit timer to only be reset if data ACKed/SACKed
mm/page_alloc: Remove kernel address exposure in free_reserved_area()
leak in O_DIRECT readv past the EOF
usb: renesas_usbhs: fix the behavior of some usbhs_pkt_handle
usb: renesas_usbhs: fix the sequence in xfer_work()
usb: renesas_usbhs: Fix DMAC sequence for receiving zero-length packet
fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked in ticket decode
xfrm: policy: check policy direction value
nl80211: check for the required netlink attributes presence
ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
MIPS: Send SIGILL for BPOSGE32 in `__compute_return_epc_for_insn'
serial: ifx6x60: fix use-after-free on module unload
KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length
usb: chipidea: debug: check before accessing ci_role
cpufreq: conservative: Allow down_threshold to take values from 1 to 10
powerpc/kprobes: Pause function_graph tracing during jprobes handling
staging: comedi: fix clean-up of comedi_class in comedi_init()
brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls
crypto: talitos - Extend max key length for SHA384/512-HMAC and AEAD
PM / Domains: Fix unsafe iteration over modified list of device links
powerpc/64: Fix atomic64_inc_not_zero() to return an int
powerpc: Fix emulation of mfocrf in emulate_step()
powerpc/asm: Mark cr0 as clobbered in mftb()
usb: renesas_usbhs: fix usbhsc_resume() for !USBHSF_RUNTIME_PWCTRL
MIPS: Actually decode JALX in `__compute_return_epc_for_insn'
MIPS: Fix unaligned PC interpretation in `compute_return_epc'
MIPS: math-emu: Prevent wrong ISA mode instruction emulation
libata: array underflow in ata_find_dev()
workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be ordered
ext4: fix SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA for blocksize < pagesize
ext4: fix overflow caused by missing cast in ext4_resize_fs()
media: platform: davinci: return -EINVAL for VPFE_CMD_S_CCDC_RAW_PARAMS ioctl
target: Avoid mappedlun symlink creation during lun shutdown
fuse: initialize the flock flag in fuse_file on allocation
scsi: zfcp: fix queuecommand for scsi_eh commands when DIX enabled
scsi: zfcp: add handling for FCP_RESID_OVER to the fcp ingress path
scsi: zfcp: fix missing trace records for early returns in TMF eh handlers
scsi: zfcp: fix payload with full FCP_RSP IU in SCSI trace records
scsi: zfcp: trace HBA FSF response by default on dismiss or timedout late response
usb: renesas_usbhs: fix the BCLR setting condition for non-DCP pipe
usb: renesas_usbhs: fix usbhsf_fifo_clear() for RX direction
iommu/amd: Finish TLB flush in amd_iommu_unmap()
direct-io: Prevent NULL pointer access in submit_page_section
USB: serial: console: fix use-after-free after failed setup
KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key
FS-Cache: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
ext4: keep existing extra fields when inode expands
MIPS: Fix mips_atomic_set() retry condition
KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
KEYS: encrypted: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
md/bitmap: disable bitmap_resize for file-backed bitmaps.
lib/digsig: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
netfilter: invoke synchronize_rcu after set the _hook_ to NULL
md/raid10: submit bio directly to replacement disk
md: fix super_offset endianness in super_1_rdev_size_change
lib/cmdline.c: fix get_options() overflow while parsing ranges
ext4: fix SEEK_HOLE
net: prevent sign extension in dev_get_stats()
kernel/extable.c: mark core_kernel_text notrace
wext: handle NULL extra data in iwe_stream_add_point better
netfilter: nf_ct_ext: fix possible panic after nf_ct_extend_unregister
ext4: in ext4_seek_{hole,data}, return -ENXIO for negative offsets
ext4: avoid deadlock when expanding inode size
sctp: don't dereference ptr before leaving _sctp_walk_{params, errors}()
sctp: fix the check for _sctp_walk_params and _sctp_walk_errors
sctp: fully initialize the IPv6 address in sctp_v6_to_addr()
sctp: potential read out of bounds in sctp_ulpevent_type_enabled()
tcp: disallow cwnd undo when switching congestion control
netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: add more sanity tests on tcph->doff
tcp: reset sk_rx_dst in tcp_disconnect()
tcp: avoid setting cwnd to invalid ssthresh after cwnd reduction states
tcp: when rearming RTO, if RTO time is in past then fire RTO ASAP
tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
net/packet: check length in getsockopt() called with PACKET_HDRLEN
net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto
net/mlx4_core: Fix VF overwrite of module param which disables DMFS on new probed PFs
net: 8021q: Fix one possible panic caused by BUG_ON in free_netdev
x86/io: Add "memory" clobber to insb/insw/insl/outsb/outsw/outsl
kvm: async_pf: fix rcu_irq_enter() with irqs enabled
net: ping: do not abuse udp_poll()
scsi: qla2xxx: don't disable a not previously enabled PCI device
drm/vmwgfx: Handle vmalloc() failure in vmw_local_fifo_reserve()
net: xilinx_emaclite: fix receive buffer overflow
serial: efm32: Fix parity management in 'efm32_uart_console_get_options()'
x86/mm/32: Set the '__vmalloc_start_set' flag in initmem_init()
mfd: omap-usb-tll: Fix inverted bit use for USB TLL mode
pvrusb2: reduce stack usage pvr2_eeprom_analyze()
usb: r8a66597-hcd: select a different endpoint on timeout
usb: r8a66597-hcd: decrease timeout
drivers/misc/c2port/c2port-duramar2150.c: checking for NULL instead of IS_ERR()
net: phy: fix marvell phy status reading
net: korina: Fix NAPI versus resources freeing
xfrm: NULL dereference on allocation failure
xfrm: Oops on error in pfkey_msg2xfrm_state()
cpufreq: s3c2416: double free on driver init error path
KVM: x86: zero base3 of unusable segments
KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()
ipv6: avoid unregistering inet6_dev for loopback
cfg80211: Validate frequencies nested in NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES
cfg80211: Check if PMKID attribute is of expected size
mm: fix overflow check in expand_upwards()
crypto: caam - fix signals handling
ir-core: fix gcc-7 warning on bool arithmetic
udf: Fix deadlock between writeback and udf_setsize()
perf annotate: Fix broken arrow at row 0 connecting jmp instruction to its target
net/mlx4: Remove BUG_ON from ICM allocation routine
ipv4: initialize fib_trie prior to register_netdev_notifier call.
workqueue: implicit ordered attribute should be overridable
packet: fix tp_reserve race in packet_set_ring
staging:iio:resolver:ad2s1210 fix negative IIO_ANGL_VEL read
ALSA: core: Fix unexpected error at replacing user TLV
ACPI / APEI: Add missing synchronize_rcu() on NOTIFY_SCI removal
qlge: avoid memcpy buffer overflow
ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destruction
ipv6: fix typo in fib6_net_exit()
ip6_gre: fix endianness errors in ip6gre_err
crypto: AF_ALG - remove SGL terminator indicator when chaining
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix an integer overflow in sysfs code
tracing: Apply trace_clock changes to instance max buffer
tracing: Erase irqsoff trace with empty write
btrfs: prevent to set invalid default subvolid
IB/ipoib: rtnl_unlock can not come after free_netdev
team: fix memory leaks
IB/qib: fix false-postive maybe-uninitialized warning
KVM: nVMX: fix guest CR4 loading when emulating L2 to L1 exit
usb: gadget: composite: Fix use-after-free in usb_composite_overwrite_options
scsi: scsi_dh_emc: return success in clariion_std_inquiry()
can: esd_usb2: Fix can_dlc value for received RTR, frames
x86/apic: fix build breakage caused by incomplete backport to 3.10
Linux 3.10.108
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
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Merge 3.10.106 into android-msm-bullhead-3.10-oreo-m5
Changes in 3.10.106: (252 commits)
packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
crypto: crypto_memneq - add equality testing of memory regions w/o timing leaks
EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
libceph: don't set weight to IN when OSD is destroyed
KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs
fbdev: color map copying bounds checking
selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()
xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window
xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined as session keyrings
KEYS: Change the name of the dead type to ".dead" to prevent user access
KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
locking/rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race
m68k: Fix ndelay() macro
hotplug: Make register and unregister notifier API symmetric
Btrfs: fix tree search logic when replaying directory entry deletes
USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix open error path
block_dev: don't test bdev->bd_contains when it is not stable
crypto: caam - fix AEAD givenc descriptors
ext4: fix mballoc breakage with 64k block size
ext4: fix stack memory corruption with 64k block size
ext4: reject inodes with negative size
ext4: return -ENOMEM instead of success
f2fs: set ->owner for debugfs status file's file_operations
block: protect iterate_bdevs() against concurrent close
scsi: zfcp: fix use-after-"free" in FC ingress path after TMF
scsi: zfcp: do not trace pure benign residual HBA responses at default level
scsi: zfcp: fix rport unblock race with LUN recovery
ftrace/x86_32: Set ftrace_stub to weak to prevent gcc from using short jumps to it
IB/mad: Fix an array index check
IB/multicast: Check ib_find_pkey() return value
powerpc: Convert cmp to cmpd in idle enter sequence
usb: gadget: composite: Test get_alt() presence instead of set_alt()
USB: serial: omninet: fix NULL-derefs at open and disconnect
USB: serial: quatech2: fix sleep-while-atomic in close
USB: serial: pl2303: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: verify endpoints at probe
USB: serial: spcp8x5: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: io_ti: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: io_ti: fix another NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: iuu_phoenix: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: garmin_gps: fix memory leak on failed URB submit
USB: serial: ti_usb_3410_5052: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: io_edgeport: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: oti6858: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: cyberjack: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: kobil_sct: fix NULL-deref in write
USB: serial: mos7840: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: mos7720: fix NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: mos7720: fix use-after-free on probe errors
USB: serial: mos7720: fix parport use-after-free on probe errors
USB: serial: mos7720: fix parallel probe
usb: xhci-mem: use passed in GFP flags instead of GFP_KERNEL
usb: musb: Fix trying to free already-free IRQ 4
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix bogus error return in snd_usb_create_stream()
USB: serial: kl5kusb105: abort on open exception path
staging: iio: ad7606: fix improper setting of oversampling pins
usb: dwc3: gadget: always unmap EP0 requests
cris: Only build flash rescue image if CONFIG_ETRAX_AXISFLASHMAP is selected
hwmon: (ds620) Fix overflows seen when writing temperature limits
clk: clk-wm831x: fix a logic error
iommu/amd: Fix the left value check of cmd buffer
scsi: mvsas: fix command_active typo
target/iscsi: Fix double free in lio_target_tiqn_addtpg()
mmc: mmc_test: Uninitialized return value
powerpc/pci/rpadlpar: Fix device reference leaks
ser_gigaset: return -ENOMEM on error instead of success
net, sched: fix soft lockup in tc_classify
net: stmmac: Fix race between stmmac_drv_probe and stmmac_open
gro: Enter slow-path if there is no tailroom
gro: use min_t() in skb_gro_reset_offset()
gro: Disable frag0 optimization on IPv6 ext headers
powerpc: Fix build warning on 32-bit PPC
Input: i8042 - add Pegatron touchpad to noloop table
mm/hugetlb.c: fix reservation race when freeing surplus pages
USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix line-state error handling
USB: serial: ch341: fix initial modem-control state
USB: serial: ch341: fix open error handling
USB: serial: ch341: fix control-message error handling
USB: serial: ch341: fix open and resume after B0
USB: serial: ch341: fix resume after reset
USB: serial: ch341: fix modem-control and B0 handling
x86/cpu: Fix bootup crashes by sanitizing the argument of the 'clearcpuid=' command-line option
NFSv4.1: nfs4_fl_prepare_ds must be careful about reporting success.
powerpc/ibmebus: Fix further device reference leaks
powerpc/ibmebus: Fix device reference leaks in sysfs interface
IB/mlx4: Set traffic class in AH
IB/mlx4: Fix port query for 56Gb Ethernet links
perf scripting: Avoid leaking the scripting_context variable
ARM: dts: imx31: fix clock control module interrupts description
svcrpc: don't leak contexts on PROC_DESTROY
mmc: mxs-mmc: Fix additional cycles after transmission stop
mtd: nand: xway: disable module support
ubifs: Fix journal replay wrt. xattr nodes
arm64/ptrace: Preserve previous registers for short regset write
arm64/ptrace: Avoid uninitialised struct padding in fpr_set()
arm64/ptrace: Reject attempts to set incomplete hardware breakpoint fields
ARM: ux500: fix prcmu_is_cpu_in_wfi() calculation
ite-cir: initialize use_demodulator before using it
fuse: do not use iocb after it may have been freed
crypto: caam - fix non-hmac hashes
drm/i915: Don't leak edid in intel_crt_detect_ddc()
s5k4ecgx: select CRC32 helper
platform/x86: intel_mid_powerbtn: Set IRQ_ONESHOT
net: fix harmonize_features() vs NETIF_F_HIGHDMA
tcp: initialize max window for a new fastopen socket
svcrpc: fix oops in absence of krb5 module
ARM: 8643/3: arm/ptrace: Preserve previous registers for short regset write
mac80211: Fix adding of mesh vendor IEs
scsi: zfcp: fix use-after-free by not tracing WKA port open/close on failed send
drm/i915: fix use-after-free in page_flip_completed()
net: use a work queue to defer net_disable_timestamp() work
ipv4: keep skb->dst around in presence of IP options
netlabel: out of bound access in cipso_v4_validate()
ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads
ping: fix a null pointer dereference
l2tp: do not use udp_ioctl()
packet: fix races in fanout_add()
packet: Do not call fanout_release from atomic contexts
net: socket: fix recvmmsg not returning error from sock_error
USB: serial: mos7840: fix another NULL-deref at open
USB: serial: ftdi_sio: fix modem-status error handling
USB: serial: ftdi_sio: fix extreme low-latency setting
USB: serial: ftdi_sio: fix line-status over-reporting
USB: serial: spcp8x5: fix modem-status handling
USB: serial: opticon: fix CTS retrieval at open
USB: serial: ark3116: fix register-accessor error handling
x86/platform/goldfish: Prevent unconditional loading
goldfish: Sanitize the broken interrupt handler
ocfs2: do not write error flag to user structure we cannot copy from/to
mfd: pm8921: Potential NULL dereference in pm8921_remove()
drm/nv50/disp: min/max are reversed in nv50_crtc_gamma_set()
net: 6lowpan: fix lowpan_header_create non-compression memcpy call
vti4: Don't count header length twice.
net/sched: em_meta: Fix 'meta vlan' to correctly recognize zero VID frames
MIPS: OCTEON: Fix copy_from_user fault handling for large buffers
MIPS: Clear ISA bit correctly in get_frame_info()
MIPS: Prevent unaligned accesses during stack unwinding
MIPS: Fix get_frame_info() handling of microMIPS function size
MIPS: Fix is_jump_ins() handling of 16b microMIPS instructions
MIPS: Calculate microMIPS ra properly when unwinding the stack
MIPS: Handle microMIPS jumps in the same way as MIPS32/MIPS64 jumps
uvcvideo: Fix a wrong macro
scsi: aacraid: Reorder Adapter status check
ath9k: use correct OTP register offsets for the AR9340 and AR9550
fuse: add missing FR_FORCE
RDMA/core: Fix incorrect structure packing for booleans
NFSv4: fix getacl head length estimation
s390/qdio: clear DSCI prior to scanning multiple input queues
IB/ipoib: Fix deadlock between rmmod and set_mode
ktest: Fix child exit code processing
nlm: Ensure callback code also checks that the files match
dm: flush queued bios when process blocks to avoid deadlock
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix OOB data sanity check
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix OOB-event processing
MIPS: ip27: Disable qlge driver in defconfig
tracing: Add #undef to fix compile error
USB: serial: safe_serial: fix information leak in completion handler
USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
USB: iowarrior: fix NULL-deref at probe
USB: iowarrior: fix NULL-deref in write
USB: serial: io_ti: fix NULL-deref in interrupt callback
USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
vxlan: correctly validate VXLAN ID against VXLAN_N_VID
ipv4: mask tos for input route
locking/static_keys: Add static_key_{en,dis}able() helpers
net: net_enable_timestamp() can be called from irq contexts
dccp/tcp: fix routing redirect race
net sched actions: decrement module reference count after table flush.
perf/core: Fix event inheritance on fork()
isdn/gigaset: fix NULL-deref at probe
xen: do not re-use pirq number cached in pci device msi msg data
net: properly release sk_frag.page
net: unix: properly re-increment inflight counter of GC discarded candidates
Input: ims-pcu - validate number of endpoints before using them
Input: hanwang - validate number of endpoints before using them
Input: yealink - validate number of endpoints before using them
Input: cm109 - validate number of endpoints before using them
USB: uss720: fix NULL-deref at probe
USB: idmouse: fix NULL-deref at probe
USB: wusbcore: fix NULL-deref at probe
uwb: i1480-dfu: fix NULL-deref at probe
uwb: hwa-rc: fix NULL-deref at probe
mmc: ushc: fix NULL-deref at probe
ext4: mark inode dirty after converting inline directory
scsi: libsas: fix ata xfer length
ALSA: ctxfi: Fallback DMA mask to 32bit
ALSA: ctxfi: Fix the incorrect check of dma_set_mask() call
ACPI / PNP: Avoid conflicting resource reservations
ACPI / resources: free memory on error in add_region_before()
ACPI / PNP: Reserve ACPI resources at the fs_initcall_sync stage
USB: OHCI: Fix race between ED unlink and URB submission
i2c: at91: manage unexpected RXRDY flag when starting a transfer
ipv4: igmp: Allow removing groups from a removed interface
ptrace: fix PTRACE_LISTEN race corrupting task->state
ring-buffer: Fix return value check in test_ringbuffer()
metag/usercopy: Fix alignment error checking
metag/usercopy: Add early abort to copy_to_user
metag/usercopy: Set flags before ADDZ
metag/usercopy: Fix src fixup in from user rapf loops
metag/usercopy: Add missing fixups
s390/decompressor: fix initrd corruption caused by bss clear
net/mlx4_en: Fix bad WQE issue
net/mlx4_core: Fix racy CQ (Completion Queue) free
char: Drop bogus dependency of DEVPORT on !M68K
powerpc: Disable HFSCR[TM] if TM is not supported
pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
tracing: Allocate the snapshot buffer before enabling probe
ring-buffer: Have ring_buffer_iter_empty() return true when empty
netfilter: arp_tables: fix invoking 32bit "iptable -P INPUT ACCEPT" failed in 64bit kernel
net: phy: handle state correctly in phy_stop_machine
l2tp: take reference on sessions being dumped
MIPS: KGDB: Use kernel context for sleeping threads
ARM: dts: imx31: move CCM device node to AIPS2 bus devices
ARM: dts: imx31: fix AVIC base address
tun: Fix TUN_PKT_STRIP setting
Staging: vt6655-6: potential NULL dereference in hostap_disable_hostapd()
net: sctp: rework multihoming retransmission path selection to rfc4960
perf trace: Use the syscall raw_syscalls:sys_enter timestamp
USB: usbtmc: add missing endpoint sanity check
ping: implement proper locking
USB: fix problems with duplicate endpoint addresses
USB: dummy-hcd: fix bug in stop_activity (handle ep0)
mm/init: fix zone boundary creation
can: Fix kernel panic at security_sock_rcv_skb
Drivers: hv: avoid vfree() on crash
xc2028: avoid use after free
xc2028: unlock on error in xc2028_set_config()
xc2028: Fix use-after-free bug properly
ipv6: fix ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()
ipv6: pointer math error in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()
ipv6: fix the use of pcpu_tstats in ip6_tunnel
sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf
sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it
KVM: x86: clear bus pointer when destroyed
kvm: exclude ioeventfd from counting kvm_io_range limit
KVM: kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev() should never fail
TTY: n_hdlc, fix lockdep false positive
tty: n_hdlc: get rid of racy n_hdlc.tbuf
ipv6: handle -EFAULT from skb_copy_bits
fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
mm/huge_memory.c: respect FOLL_FORCE/FOLL_COW for thp
dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent
char: lp: fix possible integer overflow in lp_setup()
dccp: fix freeing skb too early for IPV6_RECVPKTINFO
Linux 3.10.106
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/mfd/pm8921-core.c
include/linux/cpu.h
kernel/cpu.c
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
net/ipv4/ping.c
commit 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 upstream.
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16a ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[wt: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b upstream.
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.
===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.
Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.
Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.
Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.
A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchanged
For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.
As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.
This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.
===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.
On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.
If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.
This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.
===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.
pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.
The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchanged
If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!
Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!
You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.
Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.
It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.
An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.
===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.
[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.
[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.
Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2
Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):
/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/
/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;
capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);
printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 58319057b7847667f0c9585b9de0e8932b0fdb08)
Bug: 31038224
Test: Builds.
Change-Id: Ib4ebe89343b032765b3b1dc79dd3817192ad3788
Signed-off-by: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@google.com>
commit 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2 upstream.
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:
3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry pick from commit 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2)
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:
3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Bug: 26636379
Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Change-Id: I10177a58a7b3178eda95017557edaa7298594d06
This fixes CVE-2013-1792.
There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created. It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.
Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.
THREAD A THREAD B
=============================== ===============================
==>call install_user_keyrings();
if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
==>call install_user_keyrings()
...
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
if (user->uid_keyring)
return 0;
<==
key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]
At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.
The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.
This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel. However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.
Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
A patch to fix some unreachable code in search_my_process_keyrings() got
applied twice by two different routes upstream as commits e67eab39be
and b010520ab3 (both "fix unreachable code").
Unfortunately, the second application removed something it shouldn't
have and this wasn't detected by GIT. This is due to the patch not
having sufficient lines of context to distinguish the two places of
application.
The effect of this is relatively minor: inside the kernel, the keyring
search routines may search multiple keyrings and then prioritise the
errors if no keys or negative keys are found in any of them. With the
extra deletion, the presence of a negative key in the thread keyring
(causing ENOKEY) is incorrectly overridden by an error searching the
process keyring.
So revert the second application of the patch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We set ret to NULL then test it. Remove the bogus test
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance
updates."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs
Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig
Yama: remove locking from delete path
Yama: add RCU to drop read locking
drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup
KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread
seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent
key: Fix resource leak
keys: Fix unreachable code
KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything,
view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and
nothing else.
This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other
processes can access the new key or create a link to it.
To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than
setting the permissions itself.
The following permissions are now set:
(1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full
permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR.
(2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but
only grant the user VIEW. This permits the user to see them in
/proc/keys, but not to do anything with them.
(3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only
grant the user VIEW and READ. This means that the user can see them in
/proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else. Possibly READ shouldn't
be provided either.
(4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does,
plus they grant the user LINK permission. The whole point of named
session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them. Possibly this
should be a separate permission to LINK.
(5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the
same permissions as an anonymous session keyring.
(6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the
possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them. The used
only gets VIEW now.
(7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by
add_key().
Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Reported-by: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still
inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm.
The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the
session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before
it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the
session keyring. See:
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211
The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring
under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other
thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The
problems are such as:
(1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from
racing.
(2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process.
(3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the
appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky.
(4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get
another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for
each thread.
A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather
than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring,
you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation
anyway.
Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This
means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code.
Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about
inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring.
Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
We set ret to NULL then test it. Remove the bogus test
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
- Replace key_user ->user_ns equality checks with kuid_has_mapping checks.
- Use from_kuid to generate key descriptions
- Use kuid_t and kgid_t and the associated helpers instead of uid_t and gid_t
- Avoid potential problems with file descriptor passing by displaying
keys in the user namespace of the opener of key status proc files.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
task_work and rcu_head are identical now; merge them (calling the result
struct callback_head, rcu_head #define'd to it), kill separate allocation
in security/keys since we can just use cred->rcu now.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
get rid of the only user of ->data; this is _not_ the final variant - in the
end we'll have task_work and rcu_head identical and just use cred->rcu,
at which point the separate allocation will be gone completely.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add() and move
key_replace_session_keyring() logic into task_work->func().
Note that we do task_work_cancel() before task_work_add() to ensure that
only one work can be pending at any time. This is important, we must not
allow user-space to abuse the parent's ->task_works list.
The callback, replace_session_keyring(), checks PF_EXITING. I guess this
is not really needed but looks better.
As a side effect, this fixes the (unlikely) race. The callers of
key_replace_session_keyring() and keyctl_session_to_parent() lack the
necessary barriers, the parent can miss the request.
Now we can remove task_struct->replacement_session_keyring and related
code.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
Do an LRU discard in keyrings that are full rather than returning ENFILE. To
perform this, a time_t is added to the key struct and updated by the creation
of a link to a key and by a key being found as the result of a search. At the
completion of a successful search, the keyrings in the path between the root of
the search and the first found link to it also have their last-used times
updated.
Note that discarding a link to a key from a keyring does not necessarily
destroy the key as there may be references held by other places.
An alternate discard method that might suffice is to perform FIFO discard from
the keyring, using the spare 2-byte hole in the keylist header as the index of
the next link to be discarded.
This is useful when using a keyring as a cache for DNS results or foreign
filesystem IDs.
This can be tested by the following. As root do:
echo 1000 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
kr=`keyctl newring foo @s`
for ((i=0; i<2000; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a $kr; done
Without this patch ENFILE should be reported when the keyring fills up. With
this patch, the keyring discards keys in an LRU fashion. Note that the stored
LRU time has a granularity of 1s.
After doing this, /proc/key-users can be observed and should show that most of
the 2000 keys have been discarded:
[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/key-users
0: 517 516/516 513/1000 5249/20000
The "513/1000" here is the number of quota-accounted keys present for this user
out of the maximum permitted.
In /proc/keys, the keyring shows the number of keys it has and the number of
slots it has allocated:
[root@andromeda ~]# grep foo /proc/keys
200c64c4 I--Q-- 1 perm 3b3f0000 0 0 keyring foo: 509/509
The maximum is (PAGE_SIZE - header) / key pointer size. That's typically 509
on a 64-bit system and 1020 on a 32-bit system.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference
so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete
with reference counting.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Optimize performance and prepare for the removal of the user_ns reference
from user_struct. Remove the slow long walk through cred->user->user_ns and
instead go straight to cred->user_ns.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The test for "if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {"
should actually testing that the (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) bit is set.
The current code actually checks for KEY_FLAG_DEAD.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The keyctl call:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1)
should create a session keyring if the process doesn't have one of its own
because the create flag argument is set - rather than subscribing to and
returning the user-session keyring as:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0)
will do.
This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and
running the following program a couple of times in a row:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
key_serial_t uk, usk, sk, nsk;
uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0);
usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
nsk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1);
printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk, nsk);
return 0;
}
Without this patch, I see:
keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66
keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66
With this patch, I see:
keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 17db2ce3
keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 39f3c73e
As can be seen, the session keyring starts off the same as the user-session
keyring each time, but with the patch a new session keyring is created when
the create flag is set.
Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If install_session_keyring() is given a keyring, it should install it rather
than just creating a new one anyway. This was accidentally broken in:
commit d84f4f992c
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100
Subject: CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
The impact of that commit is that pam_keyinit no longer works correctly if
'force' isn't specified against a login process. This is because:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0)
now always creates a new session keyring and thus the check whether the session
keyring and the user-session keyring are the same is always false. This leads
pam_keyinit to conclude that a session keyring is installed and it shouldn't be
revoked by pam_keyinit here if 'revoke' is specified.
Any system that specifies 'force' against pam_keyinit in the PAM configuration
files for login methods (login, ssh, su -l, kdm, etc.) is not affected since
that bypasses the broken check and forces the creation of a new session keyring
anyway (for which the revoke flag is not cleared) - and any subsequent call to
pam_keyinit really does have a session keyring already installed, and so the
check works correctly there.
Reverting to the previous behaviour will cause the kernel to subscribe the
process to the user-session keyring as its session keyring if it doesn't have a
session keyring of its own. pam_keyinit will detect this and install a new
session keyring anyway (and won't clear the revert flag).
This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and
running the following program a couple of times in a row:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
key_serial_t uk, usk, sk;
uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0);
usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk);
return 0;
}
Without the patch, I see:
keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 22825f8e
keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 068772be
With the patch, I see:
keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0
keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0
As can be seen, with the patch, the session keyring is the same as the
user-session keyring each time; without the patch a new session keyring is
generated each time.
Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since this cred was not created with copy_creds(), it needs to get
initialized. Otherwise use of syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
can lead to a NULL deref. Thanks to Robert for finding this.
But introduced by commit 47a150edc2 ("Cache user_ns in struct cred").
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.39)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Improve /proc/keys by:
(1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key. It won't have
one. To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been
added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively
instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively
instantiated).
(2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding
them. This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to
search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this
check.
Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant
permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check
fails.
Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with
or without this patch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix up comments in the key management code. No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Do a bit of a style clean up in the key management code. No functional
changes.
Done using:
perl -p -i -e 's!^/[*]*/\n!!' security/keys/*.c
perl -p -i -e 's!} /[*] end [a-z0-9_]*[(][)] [*]/\n!}\n!' security/keys/*.c
sed -i -s -e ": next" -e N -e 's/^\n[}]$/}/' -e t -e P -e 's/^.*\n//' -e "b next" security/keys/*.c
To remove /*****/ lines, remove comments on the closing brace of a
function to name the function and remove blank lines before the closing
brace of a function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix an incorrect error check that returns 1 for error instead of the
expected error code.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make /proc/keys check to see if the calling process possesses each key before
performing the security check. The possession check can be skipped if the key
doesn't have the possessor-view permission bit set.
This causes the keys a process possesses to show up in /proc/keys, even if they
don't have matching user/group/other view permissions.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
call_usermodehelper_keys() uses call_usermodehelper_setkeys() to change
subprocess_info->cred in advance. Now that we have info->init() we can
change this code to set tgcred->session_keyring in context of execing
kernel thread.
Note: since currently call_usermodehelper_keys() is never called with
UMH_NO_WAIT, call_usermodehelper_keys()->key_get() and umh_keys_cleanup()
are not really needed, we could rely on install_session_keyring_to_cred()
which does key_get() on success.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We were using the wrong variable here so the error codes weren't being returned
properly. The original code returns -ENOKEY.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Allow keys for which the key type has been removed to be unlinked. Currently
dead-type keys can only be disposed of by completely clearing the keyrings
that point to them.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
- is_single_threaded(task) is not safe unless task == current,
we can't use task->signal or task->mm.
- it doesn't make sense unless task == current, the task can
fork right after the check.
Rename it to current_is_single_threaded() and kill the argument.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
per-uid keys were looked by uid only. Use the user namespace
to distinguish the same uid in different namespaces.
This does not address key_permission. So a task can for instance
try to join a keyring owned by the same uid in another namespace.
That will be handled by a separate patch.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.
I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.
(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.
This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.
(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.
(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.
(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().
(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).
(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:
(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.
This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).
(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.
(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.
(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.
(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.
(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.
(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct and dangle their anchor
from the cred struct rather than the signal_struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring
arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link
the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be
a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating
process can alter the credentials of the requesting process.
This patch alters the behaviour such that:
(1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific
keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used.
(2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the
special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings
(KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then:
(a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the
key will be attached to that keyring.
(b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being
instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring().
(3) No extra link will be made.
Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators
who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so
as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings.
Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that
get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the
instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for
situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which
should be retained by the initial requestor:
+-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| | | | | |
| Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
request_key() request_key()
This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a
ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else
then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the
keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict
an extra special keyring constant is also added.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed. This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.
This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring. This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.
The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Nathan Chancellor