Commit Graph

13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Paul Moore 277d342fc4 selinux: Deprecate and schedule the removal of the the compat_net functionality
This patch is the first step towards removing the old "compat_net" code from
the kernel.  Secmark, the "compat_net" replacement was first introduced in
2.6.18 (September 2006) and the major Linux distributions with SELinux support
have transitioned to Secmark so it is time to start deprecating the "compat_net"
mechanism.  Testing a patched version of 2.6.28-rc6 with the initial release of
Fedora Core 5 did not show any problems when running in enforcing mode.

This patch adds an entry to the feature-removal-schedule.txt file and removes
the SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT configuration option, forcing
Secmark on by default although it can still be disabled at runtime.  The patch
also makes the Secmark permission checks "dynamic" in the sense that they are
only executed when Secmark is configured; this should help prevent problems
with older distributions that have not yet migrated to Secmark.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-12-31 12:54:11 -05:00
Stephen Smalley f058925b20 Update selinux info in MAINTAINERS and Kconfig help text
Update the SELinux entry in MAINTAINERS and drop the obsolete information
from the selinux Kconfig help text.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-09-12 00:44:08 +10:00
Eric Paris 64dbf07474 selinux: introduce permissive types
Introduce the concept of a permissive type.  A new ebitmap is introduced to
the policy database which indicates if a given type has the permissive bit
set or not.  This bit is tested for the scontext of any denial.  The bit is
meaningless on types which only appear as the target of a decision and never
the source.  A domain running with a permissive type will be allowed to
perform any action similarly to when the system is globally set permissive.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18 20:26:11 +10:00
Paul Moore 3bb56b25db SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22.  This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:23 +11:00
David Sterba 3dde6ad8fc Fix trivial typos in Kconfig* files
Fix several typos in help text in Kconfig* files.

Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-05-09 07:12:20 +02:00
Matt LaPlante cab00891c5 Still more typo fixes
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-10-03 22:36:44 +02:00
Matt LaPlante 44c09201a4 more misc typo fixes
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-10-03 22:34:14 +02:00
Darrel Goeddel f3f8771420 [PATCH] selinux: add support for range transitions on object classes
Introduces support for policy version 21.  This version of the binary
kernel policy allows for defining range transitions on security classes
other than the process security class.  As always, backwards compatibility
for older formats is retained.  The security class is read in as specified
when using the new format, while the "process" security class is assumed
when using an older policy format.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:52 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 016b9bdb81 [PATCH] selinux: enable configuration of max policy version
Enable configuration of SELinux maximum supported policy version to support
legacy userland (init) that does not gracefully handle kernels that support
newer policy versions two or more beyond the installed policy, as in FC3
and FC4.

[bunk@stusta.de: improve Kconfig help text]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:52 -07:00
James Morris 4e5ab4cb85 [SECMARK]: Add new packet controls to SELinux
Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old
packet controls.

Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets,
then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls.

To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is
still present, but not active by default.  To restore previous
behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a
'1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter
selinux_compat_net.  Switching between the network control models
requires the security load_policy permission.  The old controls will
probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged.

With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by
default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is
not affected at all.

It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by
default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime).  It is
also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated
userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll
probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol
helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel
configuration.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-17 21:30:05 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 99f6d61bda [PATCH] selinux: require AUDIT
Make SELinux depend on AUDIT as it requires the basic audit support to log
permission denials at all.  Note that AUDITSYSCALL remains optional for
SELinux, although it can be useful in providing further information upon
denials.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-02-07 16:12:33 -08:00
Stephen Smalley c2b507fda3 [PATCH] selinux: require SECURITY_NETWORK
Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it
requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-02-05 11:06:52 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00